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LOTTERIES AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
AMERICAN LAW
STEPHEN J. LEACOCK*
I.

INTRODUCTION1

Public policy2 is a fundamental norm of common-law
jurisdictions.3 Moreover, on more than one occasion,4 it has been
analogized to an “unruly horse.”5 Actually, in 2007, the Supreme
Court of Utah struck a note of caution and categorized its nature
as a protean one.6 This categorization was presumably motivated
 Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. Barrister (Hons.) 1972,
Middle Temple, London; LLM 1971, London University, King’s College; MA
(Bus. Law) CNAA 1971, City of London Polytechnic (now London Guildhall
University), London; Grad. Cert. Ed. (Distinction) 1971, Garnett College,
London; B.A. (Bus. Law) (Hons.) CNAA 1970, City of London Polytechnic (now
London Guildhall University), London. The author gratefully acknowledges
the assistance of Dean Leticia M. Diaz, Dean of Barry University, Dwayne O.
Andreas School of Law and the assistance of Barry University, Dwayne O.
Andreas School of Law in funding research assistance under a summer
research grant to research and write this Article. The author also gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance in the preparation of this Article
provided by Jessica L. Savidge of Barry University, School of Law and
research funds provided by Barry University, School of Law that financed that
research. However, this Article presents the views and errors of the author
alone and is not intended to represent the views of any other person or entity.
1. “Many have held and hold the opinion that events are controlled by
fortune. . . .” NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 130 (George Bull, trans.,
Penguin Books 1961) [hereinafter MACHIAVELLI].
2. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1963) (“[W]hat is commonly spoken of as public
policy [is] the good of the collective body.”). See also Robert F. Brachtenbach,
Public Policy in Judicial Decisions, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985/86)
[hereinafter Brachtenbach] (“[Public policy is] shrouded in the fog of English
antiquity . . . .”). For a somewhat contrary viewpoint, see W.S.M. Knight,
Public Policy in English Law, 38 L.Q. REV. 207, 207 (1922) (contending that
the term “public policy” is a more recent development in English law).
3. See Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 1 (proclaiming the importance of
public policy in dispute resolutions).
4. See Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP, 246 S.W.3d 653,
672-73 (Tex. 2008) (“According to the well-known dictum of an English judge,
public policy is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you
never know where it will carry you.”).
5. Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 257 P.3d 1049, 1053 (Utah Ct.
App. 2011), cert. granted, 263 P.3d 390 (Utah 2011).
6. See Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 175 P.3d 560, 563 (Utah 2007)
(emphasis added) (“To pluck a principle of public policy from the text of a
37
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by the observed reality that the contours of public policy are
subject to effortless change7 at the will of the judiciary.8 That
categorization undeniably perceives the fundamental nature of
public policy as an amorphous one.9 Undoubtedly, with respect to
the contours of public policy in the laws of the fifty states, each of
these individual states in the Federal Union would probably prefer
to be the master of its own house. Such sentiments have their
supporters.10 Moreover, identifying and interpreting public policy
may be quite a perilous task.11
Turning to lotteries,12 the prevalence and significance of
public participation in playing lotteries in modern American life
led to Congress’s creation13 of the National Gambling Impact

statute and to ground a decision of this court on that principle is to invite
judicial mischief. Like its cousin legislative history, public policy is a protean
substance. . . .”).
7. In Greek mythology, Proteus was a sea god whereas Neptune was the
Roman god of the sea. See, e.g., EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 38 (New
American Library 1969) [hereinafter HAMILTON: MYTHOLOGY] (“Proteus . . .
had the power . . . of changing his shape at will.”).
8. See Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 17 (arguing that rather than simply
beginning and ending a decision without further explanation, courts should
instead set forth a detailed description of the public policy underlying their
decisions).
9. See Penunuri, 257 P.3d at 1053 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(cautioning that “unless [public policy is] deducible . . . from constitutional or
statutory provisions, [it] should be accepted as a basis for judicial
determinations, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection[,]” given its
protean nature and the risk that it will be used solely to further a judge’s
personal preferences). See also Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 17 (asserting
that the task of defining public policy is an arduous one); RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:2, 1 (4th ed. Thomson Reuters 2011)
(stating that stare decisis rarely impacts public policy since it changes over
time).
10. See, e.g., Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in English Common Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 76, 102 (1928) (arguing that state legislatures are better able to
judge the public policy within the state than the Supreme Court would be able
to).
11. See Penunuri, 257 P.3d at 1053 (contending that public policy can be
difficult to change and should only be modified with caution).
12. See, e.g., 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 7 (2012) (setting forth the
elements of a lottery). See also KENNETH N. HANSEN & TRACY A. SKOPEK, THE
NEW POLITICS OF INDIAN GAMING 169 (U. of Nev. Press 2011) [hereinafter
HANSEN & SKOPEK] (citation omitted) (“[L]ottery . . . mean[s] any game of
chance involving the elements of prize, chance, and consideration . . . .”);
CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE: STATE LOTTERIES
IN AMERICA 51 (Harvard University Press 1989) [hereinafter CLOTFELTER &
COOK: SELLING HOPE] (stating that lotteries are embodied by individuals
buying a chance to win prizes from random drawings).
13. See Fact Sheet, NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/bio-law.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012)
[hereinafter NGISC: Fact Sheet] (stating that on August 3, 1996, President
Clinton signed the law that created the commission).
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Study Commission (NGISC) in 1996.14 In its Lotteries Report,15
the NGISC referred to the “magical thinking”16 that two
commentators wrote about in their published work.17 The two
commentators seemed to have suggested that in lottery
advertising, lottery advertisers seek to “target” this “magical
thinking”18 in an effort to stimulate a demand for lotteries.19
Arguably, this “magical thinking” engenders and also fuels those
beliefs in the power of fortune’s control over events.20 The alleged
widely held opinion regarding fortune’s control of events21 seems to
be confirmed by the vast numbers of persons who play lotteries.22
More specifically, in the context of the law applicable to
lotteries, historical experience has shown that a number of
alternatives may exist in any given state at the time that the
controversy is to be resolved by the courts. First, both a state’s
constitution and its statutes may be silent with respect to
lotteries.23 Second, lotteries may be prohibited by a state’s
14. See Index, NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N (Aug. 3, 1999),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/index.html
[hereinafter
“NGISC”]
(providing information concerning the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission). Congress set the duration of the commission for two years from
the date of its first meeting, which took place in 1997. National Gambling
Impact Study Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, §§ 4(b), 10, 110 Stat.
1482, 1484, 1488 (1996). The act mandated a report by the commission to
Congress, the President, and the governors two years after the commission
held its first meeting. Id. § 4(b), 110 Stat. at 1484. This report with the
Commission’s Final Report Recommendations was made on June 18, 1999.
National Gambling Impact Study Commission Final Report, NAT’L GAMBLING
IMPACT
STUDY
COMM’N
(June
18,
1999),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html [hereinafter NGISC:
Final Report] (describing the development of study recommendations
concerning gambling behavior in the United States).
15. See
Lotteries,
NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/research/lotteries.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2012) [hereinafter NGISC: Lotteries] (describing the history and evolution of
the lottery in the United States).
16. Id. (citation omitted) (“[L]ottery play depends on encouraging people’s
‘magical thinking’ . . . .”).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 1.
22. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (explaining that lotteries are the
only type of gambling that most adults have participated in). See also Charles
T. Clotfelter et al., State Lotteries at the Turn of the Century: Report to the
National Gambling Impact Study Commission, DUKE UNIV. 3 (Apr. 23, 1999),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/lotfinal.pdf [hereinafter Clotfelter
et al.] (“Without doubt, the ‘signature’ lottery product is lotto. . . .”).
23. See, e.g., Stone v. State of Miss., 101 U.S. 814, 818-19 (1879) (noting
that although there was no related constitutional provision, lotteries were
prohibited from 1822 to 1867, and any individual who conducted a lottery
during that period was punished for being a gambler).
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constitution alone.24 Third, a state’s constitution may be silent but
the state may have enacted a statute that prohibits lotteries.25
Finally, both a state’s constitution as well as a statutory
enactment may prohibit lotteries.26
Notwithstanding these alternatives, gambling has been
universally frowned upon throughout the entire United States.27
This remains the case in the present era.28 Moreover, “[a]s a result
of its unsavory reputation, restrictions on gambling have been
adopted by practically every country in the world throughout
history.”29 Specifically, with regard to lotteries, “for the first six
decades of [the twentieth] century[,] every [American] state
prohibited lotteries.”30 As a result of public policy disfavoring
gambling,31 the common law’s general principle is that the
judiciary will not enforce lottery agreements.32 Fundamentally,
when parties are equally at fault, courts will leave them to a
24. See id. (noting that a new constitution adopted in 1868 provided that
“the legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale of lotterytickets be allowed, nor shall any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to
be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold.”). See also MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 98
(repealed 1992) (prohibiting the lottery in Mississippi).
25. See Stone, 101 U.S. at 819 (mentioning that from 1822 until 1867,
Mississippi had no constitutional provision banning lotteries, rather it only
had statutory bans).
26. See Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855, 858-59 (Ala. 1984) (emphasis
added) (“Under [ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 65,] the State Legislature is specifically
prohibited from authorizing any type of lottery and is affirmatively required to
pass laws prohibiting lotteries.”). See also Troy Amusement Co. v. Attenweiler,
28 N.E.2d 207, 210-11 (1940) (referring to both the Ohio Constitution and a
1941 statute that provided that “in substance . . . whoever sells or disposes of a
ticket or device representing an interest in a lottery, ‘policy’ or scheme of
chance by whatever style or title denominated or known, shall be punished as
therein provided.”).
27. See, e.g., Pritchet v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 3 Yeates 458, 1803 WL 757, at
*4 (Pa. 1803) (emphasis added) (stating “[e]very species of gaming contracts . . .
are reprobated both by our law and usage.”). See also Joseph Kelly, Caught in
the Intersection Between Public Policy and Practicality: A Survey of the Legal
Treatment of Gambling-Related Obligations in the United States, 5 CHAP. L.
REV. 87, 122 (2002) [hereinafter Kelly] (noting that the anti-gambling
tradition resulted in every state determining that debts arising from gambling
are unenforceable).
28. See, e.g., Ramesar v. State, 224 A.D.2d 757, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (stating “[p]ublic policy continues to
disfavor gambling; thus, the regulations pertaining thereto are to be strictly
construed.”).
29. RICHARD MCGOWAN, STATE LOTTERIES AND LEGALIZED GAMBLING:
PAINLESS REVENUE OR PAINFUL MIRAGE 4 (Praeger 1994) [hereinafter
MCGOWAN].
30. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 235.
31. See Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 510 (1884) (citation omitted)
(holding that all contracts concerning gambling contravene public policy and
are thus illegal and void).
32. Id.
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lottery agreement where it finds them.33
Nevertheless, widespread public playing of lotteries is a
tenacious activity.34 This tenacity may be a result of the power of
“self-delusion to which even the best of men are sometimes
susceptible.”35 This power could be a factor in the condition of
problem and pathological gambling.36 The extraordinary financial
success of lotteries37 may be based upon the exploitation of this
power of human self-delusion.38 Alternatively, it could conceivably
be the case that the pain of repetitively losing when playing
lotteries may have a beneficially cathartic effect.39 Perhaps it
assists human beings in escaping the tenacious grasp of selfdelusion.40 Of course, there may be other alternative perceptions
that any one of us could effortlessly formulate.
The historical continuum of the legality of lotteries has
imitated a pendulum.41 This pendulum phenomenon of widespread
public playing of lotteries to the abstention from playing them has
taken place in synchrony with successive state legalization

33. See People v. Rosen, 78 P.2d 727, 728 (Cal. 1938) (citation omitted)
(explaining “[i]t is the law in [California] that certain games of chance, such as
lotteries, are illegal; that the winner gains no title to the property at stake nor
any right to possession thereof; and that the participants have no standing in
a court of law or equity.”).
34. Indeed, it may not be unlike the power of the American population’s
almost addictive taste in another context. See generally Scott Schaeffer, The
Legislative Rise and Populist Fall of the Eighteenth Amendment: Chicago and
the Failure of Prohibition, 26 J.L. & POL’Y. 385 (2011) (chronicling the rise and
fall of American Prohibition).
35. State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 232 N.W.2d 120, 131 (Neb.
1975).
36. See NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14, at ch. 4-2 (calling for both
public officials and individuals in the private sectors to confront problems and
pathological gambling).
37. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (“Lotteries rank first among the various forms of gambling in terms of
gross revenues: total lottery sales in 1996 totaled $42.9 billion.”). The $42.9
billion represents a 15-year increase of 950% between 1982, when the gross
revenue was $4 billion, to 1996. Id.
38. See Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 232 N.W.2d at 131 (suggesting the motivation
to lie may be rooted in self-delusion).
39. See, e.g., DAVID VISCOTT, EMOTIONAL RESILIENCE 80 (Harmony Book
1996) (contending that pain is necessary in order to “bring individuals] into
the present”). The author provides two examples of such pain: (1) when
individuals say “[p]inch me so I know I’m not dreaming,” and (2) when one
person slaps another who is hysterical in order to shock the person out of
hysterics. Id.
40. Id.; Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 232 N.W.2d at 131.
41. See infra Part III, A (noting the rise, fall, and subsequent rise once
again of lotteries in America). See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE,
supra note 12, at 43 (portraying the paradox of public policy toward lotteries in
that while they are popular, there has always been an underlying opposition
to legalizing them).
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followed by state prohibition of public lotteries.42 The sequence
may be analogized to pendulum swings from feast43 to famine44
and back again to feast with a vengeance in the present-day era.45
The pendulum phenomenon may very well reflect political
adaptations by legislators to perceived pendulum swings in public
attitudes to gambling in general and lotteries in particular.46
However, in the context of applying public policy by the judicial
branch of government to gambling per se, the conceptual norm in
American common law has remained quite stable.47 The California
Court of Appeals thunderously articulated that stable historical
judicial legal posture is the conceptual norm in American common
law.48 The court enunciated that conceptual norm as follows:
California’s “strong, long-standing public policy regarding gambling
is a broad policy against judicial resolution of civil claims arising out
of lawful or unlawful gambling contracts or transactions, and in the
absence of a statutory right to bring such claims, this policy applies
both to actions for recovery of gambling losses and actions to enforce
gambling debts.49

This Article discusses the common-law principles of public
policy applicable to lotteries in America.50 After the introduction in
Part I, Part II examines how public policy is created in principle.
Part III then explores the origins of public policy with respect to

42. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 36-38.
43. See id. at 36 (citation omitted) (“1832 [was] apparently one of the peak
years for lottery play . . . .”).
44. See id. at 38 (citation omitted) (“By 1894[,] no state permitted the
operation of lotteries, and thirty-five states had explicit prohibitions in their
constitutions against them.”). See also DENISE VON HERRMANN, THE BIG
GAMBLE: THE POLITICS OF LOTTERY AND CASINO EXPANSION 121 (Praeger
2002) [hereinafter HERRMANN] (explaining that gambling laws are the result
of both negative and positive public opinions, and they can be impacted by
local support or the lack thereof, and the power of interest groups).
45. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“Currently, 37 states and the
District of Columbia have operating lotteries.”). By 2011, this number rose to
40. NAT’L SURVEY OF STATE LAW, STATE LOTTERIES 723 (Richard A. Leiter ed.,
The Gale Group 6th ed. 2008) [hereinafter NAT’L SURVEY OF STATE LAW].
46. See generally NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (discussing the evolution
of the desirability of the lottery system).
47. Stanley v. Cal. Lottery Comm’n, No. C041034, 2003 WL 22026611, at
*19 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003).
48. Id.
49. Id. (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted). See also Meyer v.
Hawkinson, 626 N.W.2d. 262, 267 (N.D. 2001) (citations omitted) (stating that
courts will not enforce contracts that violate public policy). State laws provide
assistance for determining whether a contract is contrary to public policy. Id.
Three examples of when a contract is unenforceable for contradicting public
policy are when it is: (1) “inconsistent with fair . . . dealing,” (2) “against sound
policy”, or (3) “offensive to good morals.” Id.
50. See Clotfelter et al., supra note 22, at 1 (“Until 1964, lotteries were
illegal in every state in this country.”).

Do Not Delete

2012]

2/9/2013 4:27 PM

Lotteries and Public Policy

43

lotteries in America and presents the history and development of
lotteries over a discreet time span of American law. Part IV follows
the evolution from past to present of public policy applicable to
lotteries in America. Part V assesses the legal impact on public
policy of legislative changes in state lottery laws. Part VI reflects
upon the current and possible future public policy landscape with
respect to lotteries in America. Part VI also ruminates as to
whether or not the present era represents any departure or critical
turning points in American judicial philosophy in the context of
lotteries. Finally, the Conclusion examines the judiciary’s prowess
in adapting and applying public policy to lotteries throughout
American law.
II. HOW PUBLIC POLICY IS CREATED IN PRINCIPLE
A. Public Policy Generally
Public policy is the principle that “no one can lawfully do that
which tends to be injurious to the public or against the public
good.”51 Public policy has even been declared to be synonymous
with “the public good.”52 It has been referred to as the “purpose
and spirit of the substantive laws of a state. . . .”53 Violations of
public policy have often been associated with immorality. In fact,
some early decisions have made this association bluntly and
sometimes sanctimoniously.54 As explained by one commentator,
public policy is neither a local nor a new phenomenon.55
“Public policy consists of the ‘principles and standards
regarded by the legislature’ as well ‘as by the courts as being of
fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society.’”56 It
has been described as a “will-o’-the-wisp of the law [that] varies
and changes with the interests, habits, needs, sentiments, and
51. Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Mo. 1959). See also
CARDOZO, supra note 2, at 72 (explaining that public policy is synonymous
with social welfare or the good of the collective body.)
52. Dille v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 196 S.W.2d 615, 629 (Mo. 1946).
53. Johnston v. Chi. Great W. R. Co., 164 S.W. 260, 262 (Mo. Ct. App.
1914).
54. State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, 35-36 (1873) (evaluating the regulation of
“bawdy houses” in terms of public policy and immorality). See, e.g.,
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 127 S.W. 118, 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (“[I]t is
universally agreed that the promotion of public and private morals is one of
the chief purposes of the law . . . .”). See also Muschany v. U.S., 324 U.S. 49, 66
(1945) (holding that “violations of obvious ethical or moral standards” were
contrary to public policy); Kitchen v. Greenabaum, 61 Mo. 110, 115 (1875)
(evaluating enforceability of contracts by considering them in terms of
morality and public policy).
55. See Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 4 (footnote omitted) (recognizing
that scholars and case law first started acknowledging public policy, as it is
known today, in the fifteenth century).
56. Bolz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 52 P.3d 898, 902 (Kan. 2002).
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fashions of the day. . . .”57 Essentially, public policy is a
manifestation of the values, norms, and ideals of a society.58 It is
therefore pervasive in all aspects of the law.59 Oliver Wendell
Holms described it as “the very essence of law.”60
Identifying and declaring violations of public policy is a
delicate, subtle, and difficult intellectual task. This task legally
implicates calibrating and balancing the intersection of the legal
spheres of the legislature, judiciary and executive branches in the
constitutional law separation of powers context.61 It is not all
dissimilar to identifying and declaring fundamental constitutional
rights under the United States Constitution.62
Moreover, the application of public policy principles to
lotteries is not at all “static.”63 It is subject to “change as the
relevant factual situation and the thinking of the times change.”64
Thus, the public policy of one generation will not necessarily be
retained either in its entirety or even partially as the public policy
of another.65 The circumstances of human life change. Moreover,
57. Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. 1954).
58. Id.
59. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 413 (Belknap Press 1986)
[hereinafter DWORKIN] (reasoning that the “[law focuses on] the people we
want to be and the community we aim to have”).
60. Edith Vieth & James P. Lemonds, Whence Public Policy, 52 J. MO. B.
239, 239 (1996). See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466 (1991) (citing
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (Little, Brown & Co.
1938) (1881)) (stating that principles developed through litigation reflect
public policy which is shaped by “our practice and traditions, [and is] the
unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions”).
61. See Kathryn R. L. Rand, Caught in the Middle: How State Politics,
State Law, and State Courts Constrain Tribal Influence Over Indian Gaming,
90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 982-83 (2007) [hereinafter Rand] (mentioning the
interplay between separation of powers and public policy and the extent of
gambling permitted within a state).
62. See, e.g., Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 (1916)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (determining that in order to prevent the
Constitution from reflecting only one set of ethical opinions, “considerable
latitude must be allowed for difference of view”). Thus, while legislative
opinions cannot control courts, courts should be careful not to rule a law
unconstitutional simply because it reflects an ethical position with which they
disagree. Id.
63. Brown v. Snohomish Cnty. Physicians Corp., 845 P.2d 334, 338 (Wash.
1993).
64. Id.
65. See Funk v. U.S., 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (“The public policy of one generation may not, under changed
conditions, be the public policy of another.”); Hall v. Baylous, 153 S.E. 293, 295
(W. Va. 1930) (contending that future generations may disagree with the
current population as to what does and does not violate public policy). See also
F.A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 254 N.Y. 407, 413 (N.Y. 1930)
(asserting that public policy changes over time and that it can be identified by
state constitutions, court decisions, and the laws created by the states
legislatures).
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courts have not been oblivious to these modulations in public
policy. For example, explicitly referencing the physician’s duty of
confidentiality to his patients, the Supreme Court of Missouri,
sitting en banc, observed reflectively that “the common law and
the public policy of this state are not stagnant but are
evolutionary.”66
Therefore, the quintessential value of public policy must be
questioned continually. It must be prospected on an ongoing basis.
In this sense, it is not at all dissimilar to prospecting for the
precious metal gold. The precious nuggets must be prospected
from the surrounding debris. It is an ongoing fundamental judicial
obligation. Indeed, as the Missouri Court of Appeals has proposed,
“[c]ourts have a duty to criticize and reexamine the relationship of
the rule[s] [enunciated in earlier court decisions applicable] to
public policy and to make modifications.”67 Those modifications,
which are legally appropriate in the context of lotteries, will be the
ones selected and implemented by the judiciary.
As a result, therefore, courts reach discreet conclusions as
they become legally necessary. In some cases, courts may decline
to enforce particular components of any contract, rather than
nullifying it in toto.68 It is essentially a balancing test.69 In other
cases, where the facts and circumstances are sufficiently decisive
and the interpretation and application of public policy clear
enough, the court will forcefully rule.70 If not, the courts may

66. Brandt v. Med. Def. Assoc’s., 856 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. 1993).
67. Owens v. Owens, 854 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (citation
omitted).
68. See, e.g., Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 732 (Ala. 2002) (concluding
that courts can nullify a contract that is unconscionable or contrary to public
policy), overruled by Patriot Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 929 So. 2d 997, 1006 (Ala.
2005); Cont’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc. v. Ellenstein Enters., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 134,
139-41 (Ind. 1996) (same).
69. Cont’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 669 N.E.2d at 139-40.
70. See MidMichigan Reg’l Med. Ctr.-Clare v. Prof’l Emps. Div. of Local 79,
Serv. Emp. Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 183 F.3d 497, 506 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating
that public policy may not unambiguously support the permanent separation
of a medical care professional from further provision of medical care to the
general public, in spite of some proven acts of negligence); Fomby-Denson v.
Dept. of Army, 247 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that public policy
encouraging the detection of possible criminal activity may legally justify
particular action); Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp. in Haw., Ltd., 58 P.3d
1196, 1213 (Haw. 2002) (asserting that promises which are offensive to public
policy will not be enforced by the judiciary); Braye v. Archer-Daniels-Midland
Co., 676 N.E.2d 1295, 1303 (Ill. 1997) (concluding that indemnity promises in
construction contracts violate public policy because they do not provide
incentives for the indemnity to exercise care); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051,
1057 (Mass. 2000) (determining that public policy prevented the court from
enforcing a contract between spouses regarding frozen embryos since to do so
would result in forced procreation); First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark, 899
S.W.2d 520, 521, 523 (Mo. 1995) (determining that the lack of an operator’s
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simply remand the case for further consideration in light of the
guidance provided by the court above.71
Arguably, some bargains may be too offensive to society for
courts to rule in favor of enforcing them.72 However, enforcement
of a settlement agreement relating to such violative bargains may
nevertheless be fully enforceable based upon a state’s affirmative
public policy favoring settlements.73 It is the judiciary’s function to
properly conduct such delicate balancing.74 In the overall analysis,
proof that an agreement is injurious to the public or operates
against the public good is necessary before a court will eliminate a
party’s rights to enforcement of such an agreement.75 This is not
the same as nullifying a party’s right of freedom of contract. The
right of freedom of contract remains intact. Of course, the court
will nullify the bargain made when freedom of contract has been
abused to the point of violating public policy.76 In instances where
freedom of contract has not been abused, such contracts do not
violate public policy at all and will be enforced.77
Of course, the question as to whether or not a contract is
against public policy may very well be provided for by the state
constitution or by statute.78 Undoubtedly, when the court
determines that a contract is inconsistent with fair and honorable
dealing, it can deny such agreement enforcement.79 Similarly, if
policy of liability insurance in an insurance contract did not violate public
policy); Clark v. Columbia/HCA Info. Servs., Inc., 25 P.3d 215, 223 (Nev. 2001)
(claiming that the court may reverse a grant of summary judgment and
remand the case); Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 965 (N.H.
1996) (holding that public policy mandates that healthcare maintenance
organization’s decision to fire a physician must comply with both fair dealing
and public policy); Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 901, 905
(N.M. 2003) (concluding that a mandatory binding arbitration clause does not
offend public policy); Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 267 (refusing to enforce contract
concerning the division of lottery winnings when gambling and lotteries are
against North Dakota’s public policy).
71. See generally Owens, 854 S.W.2d at 52 (remanding case for further
consideration following the court’s consideration of public policy as it
pertained to the parent-child immunity doctrine).
72. See, e.g., Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995,
1001 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that some bargains are less repugnant than others
and may be enforced while some are more offensive and may not be enforced).
73. Id. at 1001-02.
74. See id. at 1001 (“It is all a matter of degree.”).
75. Clark, 899 S.W.2d at 523.
76. Parker, 624 N.E.2d at 1001. See also Clark, 899 S.W.2d at 521 (holding
that the court “will not recognize contractual provisions that are contrary to
the public policy of Missouri as expressed by the legislature”).
77. Johnson v. Peterbilt Fargo, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 162, 163-64 (N.D. 1989).
78. Id. at 163. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-02 (providing that it is
contrary to public policy to exempt individuals from responsibility for their
own conduct that constitutes fraud, willful injury to the person or property of
another, or willful negligent violation of law).
79. See also Meyer, 626 N.W.2d. at 267 (concluding that courts will not
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the agreement in issue is ruled by the court to be contrary to
sound policy and offensive to good morals, the court has the
authority to declare the contract void as against public policy.80
The principle that the common law has authoritatively
mandated is that one who has participated in a violation of the law
will not be granted access to the majestic judicial enforcement
machinery of the courts.81 Such a person will not be permitted to
assert in court any right based on or directly connected to the
illegal transaction.82 In this respect, the United States Supreme
Court has definitively articulated this fundamental common-law
principle as follows. The common law has mandated “the
elementary principle that one who has himself participated in a
violation of law cannot be permitted to assert in a court of justice
any right founded upon or growing out of the illegal transaction.”83
Over two hundred years ago, Lord Mansfield led the way.84
He enunciated the fundamental doctrine of ex turpi causa.85
Fundamentally, the doctrine of public policy is “litigant-blind.”86
This means that, where litigants are equally at fault, the courts
will leave the litigants as the courts find them. None of them will
be permitted by the courts to avail themselves of the legal power of
the courts. They are simply not worthy of such fundamental
assistance.
Therefore, when invalidating a contract on grounds of public
policy, courts must not apply the individual judge’s own subjective
views of public policy.87 Nor are courts permitted the license to
grant justices anarchic liberty to promote personal and private

enforce contracts that are contrary to fair and honorable dealing).
80. Peterbilt Fargo, 438 N.W.2d at 164. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-01
(deeming contracts unlawful if contrary to express law, contrary to policy of
express law—although not expressly prohibited, or contrary to good morals).
81. See, e.g., Troy Amusement Co., 28 N.E.2d at 215 (citation omitted)
(prohibiting courts of equity from protecting gambling enterprises and
nullifying the power of an injunction in such cases).
82. See id. at 216 (citation omitted) (holding that courts of equity cannot
aid parties involved with gambling enterprises because parties seeking relief
in those courts must “come with clean hands, . . . and . . . [the party’s]
demand[s] must not rest on a violation of law . . . .”).
83. Gibbs & Sterrett Mfg. Co. v. Brucker, 111 U.S. 597, 601 (1884).
84. See Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343 (Eng. 1775), available at
http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs6/98ER1120.html (proclaiming that courts will
not assist a plaintiff whose cause of action is premised on immoral or illegal
acts). The Holman court further specifies that courts refuse to provide
assistance to such plaintiffs, not as a favor to the defendant, but simply
because “they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff.” Id.
85. Id.
86. A term coined by Professor Leacock by analogy to the biological
condition of being colorblind.
87. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Conner, 973 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th
Cir. 1992).

Do Not Delete

48

2/9/2013 4:27 PM

The John Marshall Law Review

[46:37

notions of what is a good value judgment.88 Nor is expediency the
watchword of judicial behavior.89 Judges are not set free of all
restraints to indulge in the random conception of ideas of what are
the viable components of public policy.90 Indeed, public policy is
not determined by the varying opinions of laypeople, lawyers, or
judges. Opinion polls are not appropriate as valid instruments for
judicial identification of the fundamental interests of the public.91
Furthermore, public policy is not deduced from “general
considerations of supposed public interests.”92
Of course, the declaration of public policy has tended to
display certain evolutionary traits. It has now become largely the
province of legislators rather than judges because of the modern
era of legislative activism relating specifically to lotteries.93 The
underlying momentum for this imperative is not irrational. It is
appropriate because of the following reality. When compared to
the judiciary, legislators are supported by facilities for factual
investigations perceived to be more responsive to the general
public.94 Courts have openly acknowledged this.95
Furthermore, although public policy is an amorphous concept,
arguably it is not fundamentally vague and indefinite.96 In the
legislative context, therefore, public policy serves as a cumulative
conception for a number of particularly important factors. These
are the factors that influence and condition the dynamics of the
legislative debate. Public policy assists in the formulation and
validation of the legislative process.97
Turning to the judicial context, public policy is concededly not
susceptible to the formulation of an entirely precise rule to be used

88. See Penunuri, 257 P.3d at 1053 (discussing the inherent risk that a
judge will use public policy to further the judge’s own beliefs or preferences).
89. Barton v. Codington Cnty., 2 N.W.2d 337, 343 (S.D. 1942).
90. Id.
91. Haakinson & Beauty Co. v. Inland Ins. Co., 344 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Neb.
1984).
92. FDIC v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 998 F.2d 404, 409 (7th Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added). See also Fomby-Denson, 247 F.3d at 1375 (holding public
policy is not derived from public interest).
93. In re Rahn’s Estate, 291 S.W. 120, 124 (Mo. 1927).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179, cmt. b (1981).
95. In re Rahn’s Estate, 291 S.W. at 124 (asserting that the judiciary’s
function is simply to determine what is the public policy of a state). The Rahn
court ruled that it was not against public policy to enforce a will provision,
written in 1916, directing that money should be used to “assist widows,
orphans, and invalids” of Germany, which was then at war with the United
States. Id. See also Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 4 (“[Public policy is]
shrouded in the fog of English antiquity. . . .”).
96. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 9 (explaining that public
policy is an ever-changing concept).
97. See Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 1 (emphasis added) (“[O]nly
constitutional limitations restrain legislative policy declarations.”).
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in court decisionmaking.98 This makes the effort to attain precise
identification, particularization, and definition of relevant policy
considerations a challenging prospect for the courts. The
judiciary’s attainment of success in this intellectual struggle is
contextual. In a statutory context, identification of the public
policy underlying a statutory provision is predicated upon an
examination by the judiciary of the history, purpose, language,
and effect of the legislative provision in issue.99 In all other
contexts, the judiciary honors its constitutional assignment and
does its best to stay astride the unruly horse of public policy.100
B. Lottery Legalization
1. Constitutional and Statutory Position
Of course, in America, there is no fundamental101 or
constitutional right to gamble.102 Therefore, the state law of any
individual state in the United States may rightfully suppress
gambling. This fundamental legal right for the state law of each
U.S. state to ban gambling is inherent in the police powers of each
state.103 The suppression of gambling, therefore, does not interfere
with any of the inherently fundamental rights of citizenship that
the government is obligated to protect and secure.104 This legal
starting point places the legal capability to prohibit or restrict
gambling105 firmly within the scope of the state’s inherent police
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., State v. Brown, No. 37640, 2011 WL 3585530, at *1 (Idaho Ct.
App. Aug. 16, 2011) (citation omitted) (stating that when a court engages in
statutory interpretation, it must consider legislative intent, along with the
public policy underlying the statute, the legislative history, and the words of
the statute).
100. See Fairfields Ins. Co., 246 S.W.2d at 672-73 (discussing the need for
judicial restraint when it comes to public policy considerations because it is an
“unruly horse”).
101. S.C. Dept. of Revenue & Taxation v. Rosemary Coin Mach., Inc., 500
S.E.2d 176, 242 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d, 528 S.E.2d 416 (S.C. 2000).
102. See Baseball, Inc. v. Ind. Dept. of State Revenue, 672 N.E.2d 1368,
1371 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that no constitutional right to gamble
exists); Commonwealth of Ky. v. Louisville Atlantis Cmty./Adapt, Inc., 971
S.W.2d 810, 816 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling that the Kentucky Constitution
does not grant a right to engage in gambling for charitable causes); Durham
Highway Fire Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Baker, 347 S.E.2d 86, 87 (N.C. 1987) (holding
no one has a constitutional right to operate a gambling business).
103. See, e.g., Stone, 101 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
(determining that rather than giving a general and abstract definition of the
police power, each case should be decided on a case-by-case basis). It is clear,
however, that the states’ police power includes anything “affecting the public
health or the public morals.” Id. (emphasis added).
104. Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1905).
105. See Fendrich v. Van de Kamp, 227 Cal. Rptr. 262, 268 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (determining that the state’s police powers permit the state to regulate
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power.106
As a result, where a state constitutional provision specifically
prohibits lotteries, the particular state’s legislature cannot legalize
any gambling device that in legal effect amounts to a lottery.107
However, the state’s legislature would probably have the power to
regulate or to prohibit any and all other forms of gambling not
prohibited by the state constitution.108 This would flow from the
fact that the state constitution was silent on these specifics.
Of course, some state constitutional provisions not only forbid
lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets, but also any legislative
authorization of lotteries.109 If, however, a prohibition against the
creation of a state-run lottery is statutory, rather than
constitutional, the legislature has the power to create a lottery at
any later time by legislative abrogation or amendment.110 In such
circumstances, the preauthorization legal authority of a
constitutional amendment is not required.111
A constitutional exception may permit a legislature to
authorize lotteries in specific circumstances.112 Such lotteries may
constitutionally require regulation, control, ownership, and

gambling); People v. Monroe, 182 N.E. 439, 446 (Ill. 1932) (same); Am. Legion
Post No. 113 v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1190, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (same);
Louisville Atlantis Cmty./Adapt, Inc., 971 S.W.2d at 818; Brown v. State
Through Dept. of Pub. Safety and Corr., La. Gaming Control Bd., 680 So. 2d
1179, 1183 (La. 1996) (explaining that states can regulate lotteries); Parkes v.
Bartlett, 210 N.W. 492, 494 (Mich. 1926) (holding that the state’s police
powers permit the state to regulate gambling); State ex rel. Spire v.
Strawberries, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Neb. 1991) (same); State v. Bd. of
Com’rs of City of Las Vegas, 1 P.2d 570, 572 (Nev. 1931) (same); State v.
Felton, 80 S.E.2d 625, 629 (N.C. 1954) (same); Rosemary Coin Mach., Inc., 500
S.E.2d at 180 (prohibiting gambling is a legitimate governmental purpose
under the police power).
106. See, e.g., Stone, 101 U.S. at 817 (“[T]he legislature cannot bargain away
the police power of a State.”).
107. See generally Harris v. Mo. Gaming Comm’n, 869 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1994)
(holding that the legislature cannot constitutionally permit certain forms of
legalized gambling because it constituted a lottery in violation of state
constitution).
108. Lee v. City of Miami, 163 So. 486, 490 (Fla. 1935).
109. See State ex rel. Tyson v. Ted’s Game Enters., 893 So. 2d 355, 370 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2002) (ruling that Article 4, Section 65 of the Alabama Constitution
prohibits lotteries and any scheme similar to a lottery); State v. Nixon, 384
N.E.2d 152, 197 (Ind. 1979) (stating that Article 15, Section 8 of the Indiana
Constitution prohibited the lottery); Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 240
(S.D. 1994) (discussing a 1986 amendment to Article III, Section 25 of the
South Dakota Constitution which permitted the legislature to authorize a
state lottery).
110. State ex rel. Clark v. State Canvassing Bd., 888 P.2d 458, 463 (N.M.
1995).
111. Id.
112. State ex rel. Mountaineer Park, Inc. v. Polan, 438 S.E.2d 308, 318 (W.
Va. 1993).
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operation by the state. If so, only those lottery operations that are
regulated, controlled, owned, and operated in the manner
mandated by the statutorily enacted specifics can legally be
conducted.113 Of course, the express provisions of the exception
would need to be followed because of the doctrine of strict
construction.114
An absolute bar imposed by some constitutional provisions
may very well include not only lotteries, but also any enterprises,
machinations or gaming conceptions based upon the lottery
principle.115 However, interpretation of all measures whether
constitutional or statutory, would rest with the judiciary.116 So, the
judiciary may construe a constitutional provision as an absolute
bar only to lotteries. In such instances, the courts analyze each
type of gambling in issue individually and separately in order to
determine whether or not it constitutes a lottery.117 Some
gambling devices may be construed to be lotteries while others
may be ruled not to be lotteries. If a type of gambling is construed
as not being a lottery, it may very well survive legal nullification
by the courts.118 In such instances, the courts may very well
interpret the constitutional measure as excluding the forms of
gambling that do not consist of lotteries from the parameters of
the constitutional prohibition.
Of course, where lotteries are constitutionally prohibited, and
penalties are constitutionally imposed, the legislature of the
particular state cannot legitimately diminish any penalties or
other punitive measures mandated for the operation of
constitutionally prohibited lotteries.119 Proof of even the
fundamental value of financial assistance to charity provided from
the proceeds derived from the operation of such a lottery cannot
suffice to override this constitutional prohibition.120 Charitable
assistance cannot provide the necessary legal salvation to rescue a
proven lottery.121 Therefore, a lottery will not be saved by the fact
that it is conducted for charitable, patriotic, or other worthy
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Try-Me Bottling Co. v. State, 178 So. 231, 234 (Ala. 1938).
116. See State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 20 (citation omitted)
(concluding that the judiciary is the proper forum for interpreting the state
constitution’s use of the term “lottery”).
117. State ex rel. Gabalac v. New Universal Congregation of Living Souls,
379 N.E.2d 242, 244 (Ohio 1977).
118. Id.
119. Silberman v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 169 A. 170, 172 (Union Cnty. Ct.
1933).
120. See, e.g., State ex rel. Evans v. Bhd. of Friends, 247 P.2d 787, 796
(Wash. 1952) (finding that regardless of the charitable function of an
organization, if the operation runs contrary to the state constitution, it will be
deemed illegal).
121. Id.
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societal objectives or purposes.122
2. Sources of Influence on Legalization
Court decisions that implicate public policy result from
judicial awareness and evaluation of a number of interactive
factors that would have inevitably impacted the legislative
process. This decisionmaking may be analogized to the dynamic
interaction of demand and supply with respect to a good. In any
given common-law jurisdiction, similar dynamics exist by analogy
to the demand and supply in the context of legislation. In this
situation, the adoption of a state lottery is such an example. With
regard to demand, the starting point would be the opinions that
individuals possess concerning the adoption of a lottery. The
fundamental substratum of any given individual’s opinion may
very well rest upon a number of factors consisting of multiple
components. These components could be a function of the
individual’s annual income, education, age, and also her perceived
impact of the legislation on moral values and issues.
A common feature of any political decision in the United
States is that interest groups often play a noticeably significant
role in the political process.123 Their viewpoints are inextricably
intertwined with the ultimate positions that elected officials
espouse. The emotional and psychological intensity of opinions on
an issue determine the degree of individual and interest group
involvement.124 Moreover, the importance—economic and
multidimensional as indicated above—of the factors underlying
the particular issue motivates that intensity. Interest groups
materialize and proceed to agitate the community in an attempt to
influence the political decision-making machinery as shown by
examples below.125

122. State ex rel. Trampe v. Multerer, 289 N.W. 600, 604 (Wis. 1940).
123. Gregory D. Jones, Comment, Electronic Rulemaking in the New Age of
Openness: Proposing a Voluntary Two-Tier Registration System for
Regulations.Gov, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1261, 1266 (2012) (“Interest groups have
played an important role in American politics since the nation’s founding.”).
124. See Allen Hays, The Role of Interest Groups, DEMOCRACY,
http://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/DOCS/Demopaper/dmpaper9.html
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2012) (explaining that interest groups often represent or
support issues that have significant public support).
125. Id.
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3. Lobbying126
The strategic use of lobbying and making monetary political
contributions tend to be the mechanisms that interest groups use
in their attempt to achieve the greatest political impact.127 These
mechanisms are activated in order to exert the maximum leverage
upon the point of view of elected political representatives whose
votes enact the particular legislative measure or measures.128 In
addition, lobbyists may attempt to increase popular support at
large as well, rather than limiting their impact to the elected
representatives of the particular constituency.129 In this way,
individual opinions combined with interest group agitation
significantly determine the demand side of the graph that charts
the supply and demand curves of legislation that delineates the
contours of public policy.
4. Influence of Policymakers
On the supply side axis of the graph, the opinions of
policymakers may be the most viable starting point of the analysis.
These policymakers include the legislators, as well as those
persons in the executive branch who can effectuate legislation.
Since the majority of these policymakers are elected
representatives, with exceptions of course, some may consider
individual reelection as a significant political objective.130 It may
therefore be infinitely reasonable to anticipate that their positions
will reflect to some degree the present interests of those who
elected them. Interest groups routinely rack their brains in order
to invent and creatively use the most effective ways to influence
the policymakers’ decisions. Interest groups also strive to
participate in the drafting of legislation if possible.131
Another potent factor on the supply side is the nature of the
institutional structure of government itself. Legislation is not
simply a proposal followed by a vote. It is not that simple. Rather,
126. See U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (stating the First
Amendment guarantees the right to speak to, publish to, and petition the
government). See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at
141 (“[A] new element has acted as a catalyst for change: the active lobbying of
firms involved in the sale of lottery products.”).
127. See
Interest
Groups,
http://faculty.ucc.edu/eghdamerow/interest_groups1.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2011) (stating that
lobbyists are usually employed by interest groups).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Michael M. Gallagher, Disarming the Confirmation Process, 50
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 513, 567 (2003) (alleging that some representatives are as
worried about reelection as they are about constitutional issues).
131. Nick
Ragone,
Introducing
Legislation,
NETPLACES,
http://www.netplaces.com/american-government/making-a-law/introducinglegislation.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
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it must work its way through the legislative process. As a piece of
legislation is subjected to the scrutiny of legislative committees, it
is subject to frequent or, perhaps, routine modification.132 The
institutional structure of government also tends to affect the
support for a piece of legislation. When enacting bills, one
legislator may very well condition his support for one measure
upon the support from a second legislator for the legislative
initiative of the first legislator. This may very well be a relatively
routine political practice. The degree of political control that a
specific party has and exercises might also affect garnering
political support for adoption of a lottery.
5. Other Factors
The synergistic interaction between the decisions reached
between the policymakers and voters in the particular state may
affect the decisions made in other states. For example, the
profitability of lotteries in one state may affect the decision of
other states to create and implement their own lotteries.133 This
geographical proximity combined with economics may play a role
too. This is because the economic effects of a specific state’s lottery
may be quite noticeable in nearby states. As a result, citizens and
decision makers in nearby states may be influenced to take similar
action. Such states may be influenced to create a lottery of their
own as a form of financial and economic self-defense.134 This is
because the neighboring states that have enacted the lottery may
start siphoning off exigent economic resources.135 It may also be a
matter of emulation in light of the infrastructure and public
wealth apparently being accumulated. The adoption and
implementation of a lottery by one state may function as a
blueprint for another state to take similar action. It may also
provide information on the potential consequences of such
legislation. This perception may influence the positions of
individuals and policymakers from state to state with regard to
each state’s decision to enact legislation implementing lotteries in
the particular state.

132. Nick
Ragone,
Committee
Consideration,
NETPLACES,
http://www.netplaces.com/american-government/making-a-law/committeeconsideration.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
133. See Roland Santoni, An Introduction to Nebraska Gaming Law, 29
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1123, 1124 (1996) (stating that western states started
permitting lotteries after witnessing their profitability in the northeastern
states).
134. Id.
135. Ronald L. Rychlack, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 48 (1992)
[hereinafter Rychlack].
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6. Implementation Method
Ultimately, the multiple factors mentioned above interact to
produce a decision. The public policy decision is whether to adopt
or reject a state lottery. The precise method of approval of lotteries
has varied across states. Routinely, state constitutions have
needed to be amended.136 Additionally, many states have used a
statewide referendum as part of the adoption process.137 A
referendum taking the form of a popular vote after the issue had
already been approved by the legislature was used in the initial
lottery in New Hampshire.138 In New York, a constitutional
amendment followed by the endorsement of two separately elected
legislatures, as well as a public ratification, was legally
necessary.139 The use of the referendum method, of course, left the
final decision to be made by the electorate itself rather than by the
electorate’s elected representatives acting in the legislature
alone.140
Secondly, instead of a referendum, states such as California,
adopted lotteries through an initiative process.141 Finally, lottery
adoption in some states has simply required approval by each
state’s legislature and governor without a direct citizen vote.142
C. Where Courts Decline to Apply Public Policy to Nullify Some
Agreements Allegedly Connected to Lotteries
The common law is a workable system. It is not ineluctably
rigid.143 As a result, the creative use of exceptions has been its
hallmark. Therefore, where the judiciary has concluded that the
facts before the court merit enforcement, in spite of the presence of
an illegal element, the degree of contamination by the illegal
element is assessed by the courts.144 Nonreprobable degrees of
contamination will not necessarily nullify court intervention in the

136. See, e.g., CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 154-58
(detailing the state constitutional amendment campaigns to allow lotteries in
Florida and Virginia).
137. See id. at 145 (explaining that referenda and initiatives were often
necessary in order to change state policies and laws regarding lotteries
because many states had constitutional bans against lotteries).
138. Id. at 143.
139. Id. at 144.
140. See id. at 146 (“Of the nearly thirty referenda on lotteries since 1964,
only a handful have failed. . . .”).
141. Id. at 151.
142. See, e.g., id. at 5 (“In December 1973[,] the [Illinois] state legislature
passed a lottery bill, and the governor signed it into law with assurances that
the lottery would be run honestly.”).
143. Rozell v. Rozell, 22 N.E.2d 254, 257 (N.Y. 1936) (citation omitted).
144. See generally Bassidji v. Goe, 413 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing
whether illegal contracts can be enforced and whether the facts of case
warranted the court enforcing the illegal contract).
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cases presented. The judiciary will provide relief where such relief
is legally justified. In reality, in the context of each controversy
before the courts, the judiciary will assess whether or not
enforcement of an entire agreement, or a portion of it, will advance
a fundamental public policy objective. Of course, the party seeking
enforcement of the agreements affected shoulders the burden of
proving to the court that court intervention is fair, equitable and
appropriate.
For example, where the judiciary reasons that its intervention
meets these criteria, complete or partial enforcement of a claim
may be granted. Such enforcement represents performance of the
courts’ ameliorative function in the interests of justice and is
entirely appropriate. In such circumstances, court intervention in
the interests of fair and just resolution of the controversy becomes
imperative. This judicial intervention becomes an integral part of
the public policy principles of the common law itself.
There are therefore exceptions to the general principle of
nonenforcement of illegal contracts. These exceptions are fact
specific and depend upon proof of meticulously circumscribed
specifics.145 Under the common law, the holding of a lottery is not
ordinarily regarded as a penal offense unless either a state
constitution or state statute criminalizes such activity.146 In some
jurisdictions, statutes have certainly been enacted that make it a
criminal offense to promote or conduct a lottery or similar scheme
other than one operated by the state.147 The Supreme Court of the
145. See, e.g., Melton v. United Retail Merchs. of Spokane, 163 P.2d 619,
627-28 (Wash. 1945) (emphasis added) (“[A] plaintiff may recover a sum of
money from a defendant who has acknowledged that it belongs to plaintiff
even if that sum be plaintiff’s share of the profits of some illegal business or
transaction in which both were engaged and equally culpable.”). The Melton
court reasoned that it could determine “as a matter of law” a promise to pay
when a defendant acknowledges that the disputed amount of money belongs to
the plaintiff. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Lee, 163 So. at 489; Becker v. Wilcox, 116 N.W. 160, 160 (Neb. 1908);
Parr v. Com., 96 S.E.2d 160, 163-64 (Va. 1957).
147. See, e.g., Forte v. U.S., 83 F.2d 612, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (referencing to
statute that bars individuals from running, operating, or promoting a lottery);
Waite v. Press Pub. Ass’n, 155 F. 58, 61 (6th Cir. 1907) (discussing a Michigan
statute barring individuals from creating and promoting lotteries and gift
enterprises); State v. Shugart, 35 So. 28, 29 (Ala. 1903) (mentioning statute
that prohibits individuals from setting up a lottery); Burks v. Harris, 120 S.W.
979, 980 (Ark. 1909) (determining that pursuant to the state statute, it is
illegal to run a lottery); Ga. Real Estate Comm’n v. Warren, 262 S.E.2d 570,
571 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (setting up lotteries in order to give away real estate is
illegal); L.E. Servs., Inc. v. State Lottery Comm’n of Ind., 646 N.E.2d 334, 340
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (referencing statute that bars individuals from conducting
lotteries); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 166 S.W. 794, 795 (Ky. Ct. App. 1914)
(mentioning Kentucky statute that bars lotteries); Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., Inc. v. Chen, Walsh & Tecler, 460 A.2d 44, 45 (Md. 1983) (“No
lottery grant shall ever hereafter be authorized by the General Assembly,
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United States has held that laws for the suppression of lotteries
are in the interest of the morals and welfare of the people of the
state, and are therefore a legitimate exercise of a state’s police
powers.148 However, even in the face of the criminalization of
lotteries, the common law’s recognition of exceptions in deserving
cases remains legally viable.
1. Legal Impact of Differing Degrees of Culpability on
Nullification Predicated upon Violations of Public Policy
First, an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy where the agreement itself constitutes an illegal lottery.149
Nevertheless, an assertion of a cause of action may be treated by
courts as valid even though the facts of the case establish that
there is some contact with a violation of public policy. The courts
will assess the degree of legal contamination caused by the contact
with the public policy violation.150 Essentially, the judiciary
determines whether there is a fatal degree of contamination. If
there is, then the courts will not lend their assistance to any of the
parties and will leave the parties where the courts find them.151 If
the degree of contamination from any violation of public policy
falls below lethal levels, then the courts may provide assistance to
the less culpable party in appropriate circumstances.152
Youngblood v. Bailey153 is helpful in analyzing the common
law’s resolution of such intertwining issues. In Youngblood, at the
outset, the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that in the
context of a particular transaction, the component involving the
unless it is a lottery to be operated by and for the benefit of the State.”); People
v. McPhee, 103 N.W. 174, 175 (Mich. 1905) (analyzing the state statute
prohibiting individuals from setting up a lottery); State v. Lipkin, 84 S.E. 340,
344-45 (N.C. 1915) (discussing state statute that banned lotteries); Stevens v.
Cincinnati Times-Star Co., 73 N.E. 1058, 1060 (Ohio 1905) (analyzing statute
that precludes lotteries, wages, and bets).
148. See Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (“It is the duty and function of the
legislature to discern and correct evils, and by evils we do not mean some
definite injury, but obstacles to a greater public welfare.”). See also Town of
Eros v. Powell, 68 So. 632, 635 (La. 1915) (holding that lotteries fall within the
ambit of practices that corrupt morals and the state can therefore regulate it
under its police powers); State v. J.J. Newman Lumber Co., 59 So. 923, 929
(Miss. 1912) (referencing Mississippi precedent holding that lotteries can be
regulated pursuant to the state’s police powers); State v. Lipkin, 84 S.E. 340,
345 (N.C. 1915) (citation omitted) (concluding that a state can, pursuant to its
police powers, enact laws to suppress lotteries).
149. Youngblood v. Bailey, 459 So. 2d 855, 859 (Ala. 1984).
150. See id. at 860 (analyzing the two underlying agreements—one that
constituted an illegal contract and one in which fraud was present).
151. Rosen, 78 P.2d at 728.
152. See Youngblood, 459 So. 2d at 860 (refusing to leave parties where the
court found them when one party committed fraud).
153. Id. at 855.
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purchase of a ticket with a chance to win a certain luxury car was
void on grounds of public policy.154 The ticket transaction
component was “a lottery and directly violate[d] the public policy
of [the] State.”155 The legal nullification of the lottery component
took effect between the original parties to such transactions.156
However, the original purchaser of the ticket had sold the ticket to
a subsequent purchaser who had fraudulently purported to pay for
the ticket with a legally defective check.157
These additional facts raised the issue of exceptions to the
fundamental principle of nullification of transactions on grounds of
public policy. In exceptional instances, under the common law,
“contracts offensive to the public policy of the state may be
enforced because of the inability of an affected party to plead their
invalidity.”158 Success by plaintiffs in such cases is predicated upon
proof by such plaintiffs of two indispensable requirements.159 First,
plaintiffs are required to prove that they are not equally at fault
with the defendants.160 Second, plaintiffs must also prove that
public policy interests are substantively advanced by the court’s
assistance to the less culpable party or parties to the particular
transaction.161
In instances where it is proven to the courts that one party
has fraudulently induced another to enter into a particular
transaction, the courts may provide assistance to the fraudulently
induced party.162 In Youngblood, the original purchaser of a lottery
ticket had been fraudulently induced to sell the pertinent lottery
ticket to a fraudulent subsequent purchaser.163 This fraudulent
inducement by the subsequent purchaser invalidated his own
purchase of the lottery ticket.164 Additionally, the subsequent
purchaser’s fraudulent conduct left the title to the luxury car that
was won by the lottery ticket undisturbed.165 Title to the luxury
car therefore remained securely vested in the plaintiff as the
original purchaser of the lottery ticket.166
The facts and circumstances of the case were appropriate for
154. Id. at 859.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 860 (emphasis added) (finding that trial testimony demonstrated
that the underlying incident constituted the fourth time that the defendant
had perpetuated the scheme in order to defraud individuals out of their lottery
tickets).
158. Id. at 859.
159. Id. at 860.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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judicial relief to be granted to plaintiff as the original purchaser of
the lottery ticket.167 Therefore, the common law afforded relief to
the original purchaser of the lottery ticket against the fraudulent
subsequent purchaser, and also against any party whose claim
was dependent upon such subsequent purchaser’s legal
iniquities.168 The court applied these principles because the
subsequent purchaser had made fraudulent representations to the
original purchaser of the lottery ticket.169 The subsequent
purchaser’s fraudulent representations consisted of assertions to
the original purchaser that he had sufficient funds to meet the
amount of the check that he tendered to the plaintiff as payment
for the purchase of the lottery ticket.170
In his defense, the subsequent purchaser claimed that under
the terms of his subsequent purchase contract with the original
purchaser of the lottery ticket, valid legal title to the lottery ticket
was transferred to him alone.171 The subsequent purchaser made
this claim because he argued that the illegality of the original
purchaser’s acquisition of the lottery ticket from its original seller
nullified any right that the original purchaser may have had to
reclaim title to the lottery ticket from him.172 The subsequent
purchaser therefore asserted that his valid title to the lottery
ticket conferred on him alone the entire valid legal title to the
luxury car.173
The court ruled, however, that the common law disabled the
fraudulent subsequent purchaser of the lottery ticket from
pleading, as a defense, any underlying illegality of the original
purchaser’s title to the lottery contract.174 The subsequent
purchaser’s fraudulent conduct nullified any prospect of a defense
predicated upon any legal challenge by him to the original
purchaser’s title to the lottery ticket.175 This was the case because
the subsequent purchaser’s purported defense was nullified by the
fraud that he perpetrated on the original purchaser.176
The subsequent purchaser’s fraudulent conduct when
purporting to buy the lottery ticket from the original purchaser did
not place the original purchaser’s title to the lottery ticket in issue
at all.177 On the contrary, the courts did not permit the subsequent
purchaser to legally challenge the original purchaser’s title to the
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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lottery ticket or to the car.178 Such a challenge by the subsequent
purchaser was simply a bridge too far because the suit against him
brought by the original purchaser of the lottery ticket was
predicated upon the subsequent purchaser’s own fraudulent
misrepresentations.179 The original purchaser’s suit against the
subsequent purchaser was also predicated upon the subsequent
purchaser’s meretricious conduct consisting of his failure to pay
the check that he tendered to the original purchaser of the lottery
ticket.180
2. “Hole-in-One” Agreements Between Golfers and Golf Course
Owners or Operators
Not all tournaments are illegal lotteries. Therefore, a
distinction needs to be drawn between similar but legally
divergent settings. Undoubtedly, an agreement is unenforceable
on grounds of public policy where the agreement itself constitutes
an illegal lottery. An example of such an unenforceable agreement
exists where a promisee has paid a specific sum of money to a
promisor and has agreed that, contingent upon the happening of a
certain specified event governed by chance, a prize will be paid to
the promisee by the promisor.181 However, in circumstances where
chance is not the dominant factor in the happening of the
contingent event, an enforceable contractual right can arise in the
context of a tournament, in spite of the presence of consideration
paid by a promissee to a promisor, combined with the promisor’s
promise of the award of a prize to the promisee.182
In instances where a promisee’s performance of an act is
bargained for by a promisor as the agreed exchange for a prize
promised to be awarded by the promisor, on the occurrence of a
specified event, some elements of chance may conceivably play a
role in the happening of the specified event that is the contingency
which triggers the payment of a prize.183 The presence of an
element of chance does not per se convert the agreement between
the parties into an illegal lottery. Chenard v. Marcel Motors184 is
instructive in this regard.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 397 So. 2d 546, 547 (Ala. 1981)
(citation omitted) (“[T]here are three elements to a lottery: ‘(1) [a] prize, (2)
awarded by chance, (3) for a consideration.’”).
182. See Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 87 (Nev. 1961)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (“The test of the character of a game is not
whether it contains an element of chance or an element of skill, but which is
the dominating element.”).
183. Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596, 601 (Me. 1978).
184. Id.
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In Chenard, a party in the State of Maine sponsored a golf
tournament at a golf club and invited an automobile dealership to
donate an automobile as a prize at the golf tournament.185 In
response, the automobile dealership donated a new automobile in
order to promote its business.186 Advertisements disseminated the
applicable terms for winning the automobile, which the automobile
dealership imposed upon golfers participating in the
tournament.187 These terms required any golfer in the tournament
to make a hole in one drive on a specified hole at the golf course.188
These terms were posted at the golf club and were also sent to
potential participants in the tournament.189 On the day of the
tournament, the automobile dealership arranged for a new vehicle
to be driven to the golf club and parked near the golf clubhouse.190
One of the automobile dealership’s advertisements was placed on
the new vehicle itself.191
The plaintiff paid the required fee and registered for the
tournament.192 At the specified hole, plaintiff shot a hole in one in
the presence of his three playing partners.193 Plaintiff then notified
the automobile dealership and claimed the new car as his prize.194
When the automobile dealership refused to deliver the new car as
his prize, plaintiff successfully sued the automobile dealership.195
The dealership then appealed the Superior Court’s refusal to
dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint based upon Maine’s antigambling
and antilottery statutes that were in effect at the time of the
tournament.196
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the judgment
of the Superior Court based upon the following reasons.197 First,
the plaintiff’s payment of an entrance fee in order to participate in
the lawful golf tournament did not, on any legal basis whatsoever,
convert the legal golf tournament into an illegal wager or
lottery.198 This was the case because the fees paid by participants
in the tournament did not make up a “purse” for the purchase of
the new automobile or for any prize to be won by any of the

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 598.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 598, 603.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 600-01.
Id. at 600.
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tournament participants.199
Secondly, the automobile dealership did not compete for the
new automobile as a participant in the golf tournament nor on any
legal basis whatsoever.200 Furthermore, the automobile dealership
did not derive any profit or any opportunity for profit from the
golfers’ entrance fees.201 On the contrary, all entrance fees for the
tournament went to the golf club, which was not in contractual
privity with the automobile dealership.202 Instead of contractual
privity, the automobile dealership had provided the new
automobile to the golf club gratuitously and temporarily, in
accordance with the terms imposed by the automobile dealer upon
the participants in the golf tournament.203 Therefore, the new
automobile was not offered by the automobile dealership as a lure
designed to sever golfers who participated in the tournament from
their money for the automobile dealer’s financial gain.204
Thirdly, the golfers who participated in the tournament paid
their entrance fees to the golf club as consideration in order to
participate in the golf tournament, and not for any other reason.205
These golfers were not risking their tournament fees as a
mechanism for making a return on their entrance fee money as is
done in any illegal wagering transaction.206 Furthermore, there
was no division whatsoever among the golfers in the tournament
of the cumulative total of the monies from the entrance fees paid
by the golfers participating in the tournament.207 Neither the
cumulative total of the monies from the entrance fees paid by the
golfers—nor any fraction or component of those monies—was
divided among the golfers as is done in an office “pool.”208
Fourthly, neither the cumulative total of the monies from the
entrance fees paid by the golfer participating in the tournament,
nor any fraction or component of those monies, formed any part of
the car as a prize.209 On the contrary, the automobile, as a prize,
was offered by the automobile dealership to the participating
golfers separately and in complete isolation from the tournament
entrance fees.210 This offer was for a “unilateral” contract, and was
made by the automobile dealership to the golfers participating in

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 600-01.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the tournament.211
The plaintiff accepted this offer when he shot the hole-in-one
at the designated hole at the golf course during the golf
tournament.212 When the plaintiff shot the hole-in-one, he
completed all of the terms bargained for in the offer and thereby
created a perfectly valid, binding, and enforceable contract with
the automobile dealership.213 Although it may be argued that
successfully achieving a hole in one implicates some element of
chance,214 nevertheless, on the facts of this case, there was no
violation of Maine’s lottery or gambling laws.215 The automobile
dealer was therefore obligated to perform its own promise under
the terms of the contract that was validly created.216
III. ORIGINS OF PUBLIC POLICY WITH RESPECT TO LOTTERIES IN
AMERICA
A. History and Development of Lotteries217
Gambling is versatile.218 Moreover, in the modern era,
lotteries are probably the most prevalent form of gambling in the
United States.219 “Both gambling in general and lotteries in
particular have long histories in this country and abroad.”220
Actually, the drawing of lots is conceivably the most ancient form
of the use of chance to influence particular outcomes.221
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 599.
215. Id. at 601
216. Id. Accord Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 359 P.2d at 87 (affirming the
lower court’s decision requiring the defendant to perform under the contract
and pay the plaintiff the $5,000 promised to him for getting a hole in one).
217. See, e.g., Lee, 163 So. at 488 (citations omitted) (“Lotteries are of
ancient origin[,]” and first rose to popularity in the sixteenth century
throughout Europe, and later the United States, as governments began
recognizing them as a means of raising revenue).
218. See Kelly, supra note 27, at 90 (emphasis added) (“Gambling can take a
nearly infinite number of forms, and each State generally has the freedom to
decide whether to legalize any form of gambling.”).
219. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“The lottery industry stands out
in the gambling industry . . . . It is the most widespread form of gambling in
the U.S. . . .”).
220. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 32. See also
HERRMANN, supra note 44, at 9 (“The earliest widespread legal gambling
activity in the United States was the lottery.”).
221. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 33-34. See also
NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“[M]aking decisions and determining fates by
the casting of lots has a long record in human history (including several
instances in the Bible). . . .”). See, e.g., Leviticus 16:8 (King James) (discussing
the casting of lots to determine fates); Joshua 18:6 (King James) (same); First
Samuel 14:42 (King James) (same); Proverbs 16:33 (King James) (same); First
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Furthermore, it has been proposed that games of chance existed in
antiquity.222 Certainly, the “drawing of lots” probably constitutes
the most numerous references to “gambling” in the Holy Bible.223
Of course, the sophisticated technology of modern gambling was in
all likelihood unavailable in biblical times. Additionally, in the
historical context, the drawing of lots was probably also a readily
available uncomplicated form of decisionmaking.
1. The Rise
Apparently, in Europe, lotteries may have initially been
perceived as pleasurable distractions and were therefore included
in ancient celebrations.224 However, the private commercial
potential of lotteries must have become self-evident.225 This
apparently led to the use of lotteries by some merchants in Europe
to dispose of excess stock or merchandise that remained unsold for
too long, and also for the disposal of items that proved rather
difficult to sell.226
Moreover, governmental perception of the prospective use of
lotteries undoubtedly materialized as well.227 Governments must
have become aware of the potential use of lotteries for revenue
enhancement. This awareness could easily have been created by
the governmental perception of the comparatively painless impact
of lotteries when compared to the less attractive governmental
mechanism of raising its revenue by taxation.228
Turning more specifically to the North American history of
Chronicles 26:13 (King James) (same).
222. See Rychlack, supra note 135, at 15 (citation omitted) (explaining that
gambling has been prevalent throughout history as evidenced by its existence
“among ancient Egyptians, Chinese, Japanese, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans and
the early Germanic Tribes”).
223. See also NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (mentioning the discussions
concerning casting lots found in the Bible).
224. See Rychlack, supra note 135, at 20-21 (explaining that lotteries first
started out simply as party games).
225. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“[T]he use . . . [of] lotteries for
material gain is of more recent origin, although of considerable antiquity.”).
226. See Rychlack, supra note 135, at 21 (explaining that merchants used
lotteries to help sell excess merchandise).
227. See generally NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“The first recorded
public lottery in the West was held during the reign of Augustus Caesar for
municipal repairs in Rome.”). Sources are not unanimous on the date of the
first lottery. Compare id. (stating that the first lottery was held in 1466), with
CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34 (stating that the
first lotteries occurred in 1530).
228. See generally NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (explaining that Belgium
was the home of the first lottery that awarded money and the purpose of
which was to provide assistance to the poor). But see also CLOTFELTER &
COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34 (endnote omitted) (“The first
lotteries offering prizes of money was held in Florence in 1530, with proceeds
going to the state.”).
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lotteries, one of the first lotteries was held in London in 1612, for
the benefit of the early Virginia Colony in America.229 Over the life
of these lotteries, the Virginia Colony’s gain was the British
public’s loss because the profits redounded to North America and
not to the British public.230 This inevitably led to the termination
of these lotteries in due course,231 and domestic American colonial
lotteries replaced the British ones.232
Lotteries became popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries in North America.233 Both the government and private
parties used them.234 Banking institutions and similar financial
mechanisms were not fully developed in the colonies in this era.235
It certainly appears that some institutions used lotteries to finance
building projects for both public and private use.236 Canals,

229. See DAVID NIBERT, HITTING THE LOTTERY JACKPOT: STATE
GOVERNMENTS AND THE TAXING OF DREAMS 19 (Monthly Review Press 2000)
[hereinafter NIBERT] (“In 1612, James I, the king of England, granted the
Virginia Company a charter that permitted the establishment of a lottery to
fund the struggling colony.”). See also MATTHEW SWEENEY, THE LOTTERY
WARS 15 (Bloomsbury 2009) [hereinafter SWEENEY] (describing the first
lottery for America); Rychlack, supra note 135, at 24 (discussing the purpose of
England’s lotteries benefiting Virginia in 1612); NGISC: Lotteries, supra note
15 (analyzing the lottery’s importance in providing financial assistance to the
colonies).
230. See NIBERT, supra note 229, at 19 (endnote omitted) (explaining that
by 1620, lotteries accounted for about half of all financial support for the
colonies). See also Rychlack, supra note 135, at 24 (explaining that the benefits
of the British lottery benefited the Colonies, not Britain).
231. See Rychlack, supra note 135, at 24 (examining the termination of
Virginia Company’s charter). See also MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 6
(explaining that the Virginia Company was ordered to stop issuing lottery
tickets since its lottery was much more profitable than the fledgling English
lottery).
232. See Rychlack, supra note 135, at 24 (commenting that once the British
lotteries were revoked, the colonies formed domestic lotteries). See also
CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34 (“In colonial
America lotteries were a popular and common means of financing public
projects . . . . All of the colonies authorized lotteries at one time or another,
and a few of them used the device on many occasions.”).
233. See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 6-8 (discussing the history of lotteries
in America). See also NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (explaining the history
of lotteries in America); Rychlack, supra note 135, at 25-29 (analyzing early
American lotteries).
234. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34
(discussing the colonial use of lotteries).
235. See Rychlack, supra note 134, at 31 (explaining that America did not
have a developed banking system in the early nineteenth century). See also
CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 35 (“Capital markets
were rudimentary, to say the least, before a national banking system had been
firmly established.”).
236. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34
(discussing early Colonial uses of lottery funds).
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bridges, and roads were funded through the use of lotteries.237 So,
too, were construction projects for a number of colleges,238
including “Harvard, Yale, King’s College (Columbia University),
Princeton, Rutgers, Dartmouth, Rhode Island College (Brown
University), the University of Pennsylvania, the University of
North Carolina and the University of Michigan. . . .”239
Colonial authorities tended to use lotteries for specific
building projects as well.240 Of course, some lotteries operated
outside of government supervision.241 To be sure, some lotteries
were put to noble or charitable uses.242 First, some colonies, and
later some states, used lotteries to support military activities
during the French and Indian Wars of the eighteenth century.243
Moreover, use of lotteries during the Revolutionary War era also
occurred.244 It seems that the Continental Congress authorized at
least one lottery “to support the Continental Army in 1776. . . .”245
In the early history of the new American nation in the
nineteenth century, lotteries seemed to be particularly popular.246
In 1810, Thomas Jefferson initially seemed to be opposed to
lotteries “however laudable or desirable [their] object[s] may be.”247
He apparently changed his mind in 1826, however, when he
encountered financial turbulence and needed funds to alleviate the
exigent needs of his personal estate.248 He apparently hoped to
237. See id. at 34 (analyzing public projects funded by colonial lotteries).
238. Id. See also NIBERT, supra note 229, at 21 (explaining the purpose of
early American lotteries).
239. Rychlack, supra note 135, at 25.
240. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 34
(commenting on the fact that “the line between public and private was
typically indistinct”).
241. Id. (explaining that while some lotteries, the purpose of which was
private profit, existed, they were never legalized).
242. See id. at 35 (explaining that lotteries were considered to be a
voluntary tax that raised money for charitable organizations, such as religious
organizations).
243. See NIBERT, supra note 229, at 22 (“The global struggles for empire
that embroiled the colonists in the French and Indian War also brought
considerable hardship and expense, and lotteries were used to subsidize
colonial war-related activities.”).
244. Id. at 22-23. See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note
12, at 34 (recognizing the important function of lotteries during the
Revolutionary Wars—raising money to support soldiers).
245. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 36
(discussing Congress’ authorization of a lottery to support the Continental
Army in 1776). See also MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 10 (pointing to the
creation of the national lottery to raise funds).
246. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 35 (citing
the popularity of lotteries during the nineteenth century).
247. Id. at 299 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS (New York: Library of
America 1984)).
248. Id. See also MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 9 (referencing Jefferson’s
need to initiate a lottery to cover debts).
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persuade the Virginia legislature to permit him to operate a
lottery for this purpose.249 In the later years of his career, he may
have mellowed on the fundamental nature of lotteries.250 Jefferson
described the lottery mechanism as a “painless tax,” “paid only by
the willing.”251
Lotteries multiplied in the early decades of the nineteenth
century.252 In 1832, the income received from sales of tickets
constituted three percent of the national income.253 However, the
reform movement led by President Andrew Jackson intensified
and sharpened opposition to lottery operations as a whole.254
Imprecise regulations and relatively lax controls had contributed
to scandals surrounding a number of lottery operations.255 This all
led to curbs on lotteries and, in 1833, individual states started
enacting statutes that prohibited lotteries.256
The Civil War era and its economic devastation of the
American South led several states to again consider lotteries for
statewide financial salvation.257 Some Southern states established
lotteries as means of raising revenues during the period of
relatively extensive depressed governmental revenues caused by
the Civil War.258 Defeat and reconstruction played a major role in
the difficult financial times experienced in these states.259 The
Louisiana lottery was probably the largest of them all.260
249. MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 9.
250. Id.
251. Id. See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 299
(attributing the phrase “painless tax” to Thomas Jefferson).
252. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 36
(describing the popularity and increase of lotteries during the 19th century).
253. Id.
254. See id. at 37 (contending that some historians suggest the Jacksonian
resentment of privilege was a motivating source for opposition of lotteries).
255. Id. See also Rychlack, supra note 135, at 32 (contending that lottery
opposition began to mount due to the change in social reform and the reaction
to the corruption and abuse that existed within the lottery system).
256. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 37-38
(“First the northeastern states, then the southern and western states
abolished lotteries until, by 1860, only three states—Delaware, Missouri, and
Kentucky—still allowed them.”).
257. See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14 (describing how the South turned
to lotteries on account of economic distress exacerbated by the end of the Civil
War and the North’s unwillingness to lend money or raw materials to aid in
the reconstruction).
258. Id.
259. Id. See also Rychlack, supra note 135, at 38-39 (stating that “[t]here
was a brief revival of state-run lotteries in the 1860s” due to economic
hardships stemming from the Civil War and Reconstruction).
260. See MCGOWAN supra note 29, at 14 (describing the Lousiana Lottery as
“[t]he most famous and long-lasting” with “tickets hawked in every major
city”). See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 55 (“By some estimates . . . the
Octopus brought in as much as $30 million a year from customers, more than
90 percent of whom lived in other states.”); CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING
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2. The Fall
In the early 1890’s the federal government began to consider
legislation to bar lotteries from using the federal mail system.261
As these efforts opposing lotteries intensified, Louisiana
lawmakers were persuaded in 1868 to charter a private company
to run a lottery.262 Of course, the individual states have legal
power generally to regulate lotteries within the borders of each
state.263 However, the attempts by states other than Louisiana to
raise funds from gambling of this type were relatively short lived
and by the end of the Civil War era, no lotteries legally survived,264
except the Louisiana Lottery, which survived into the 1890s.265
Other states had by now ended their own lottery initiatives and
this development left Louisiana’s lottery in a monopoly position in
the entire United States.266
The Louisiana lottery survived because two private brokers
won a charter from the State of Louisiana.267 These two private
brokers then hired two retired Confederate generals to oversee the
lottery drawings and to promote a nationwide campaign to
popularize drawings.268 The national reach of the Louisiana
Lottery and the fact that it was held on a weekly basis let it to be
described as a serpent.269 The mail system was used to purchase
and sell tickets.270 When the expiration date of the lottery charter

HOPE, supra note 12, at 38 (“[O]ver 90 percent of its revenue [came] from out
of state.”).
261. MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 15.
262. Rychlak, supra note 135, at 40.
263. See HERRMANN, supra note 44, at 4 (recognizing that policies
concerning gambling mostly fall within the ambit of the Tenth Amendment’s
police powers).
264. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 38.
265. MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14-15; CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING
HOPE, supra note 12, at 38.
266. See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14 (stating that by the 1880’s,
Louisiana was the only state with a lottery since the other states had either
given up on lotteries or had banned them). See also Rychlack, supra note 135,
at 40-41 (citations omitted) (“Because its books were kept secret . . . it has by
now been estimated that at its height of popularity, the Louisiana lottery was
a nationwide monopoly making annual profits of up to $3 million. . . .”).
267. See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14 (explaining that John Morris and
Charles Howard were the brokers in charge of the Louisiana Lottery). See also
Rychlack, supra note 135, at 41 (citation omitted) (explaining that while “the
Louisiana Lottery was run by a New York gambling syndicate[,] . . . [t]o lend
an air of respectability, two former confederate generals . . . were hired to
oversee the drawings.”).
268. MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14.
269. Id. See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 54 (“The Louisiana Lottery
was known as the Octopus because its arms reached into every state and
city.”); Rychlack, supra note 135, at 40 (citation omitted) (referencing “The
Serpent,” which was the Louisiana Lottery’s nickname).
270. See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 14 (stating that “[m]ore than $3
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approached, one of the private brokers sought a renewal by
offering the State of Louisiana a sum of one million dollars a
year.271
This apparently brazen entrepreneurial initiative backfired.
Unfortunately, it seemed that considerable opposition to the
lottery had developed ubiquitously around the entire United
States.272 The operators of the lottery were accused of corruption
and bribery.273 Additionally, the federal government purported to
enact a number of statutes designed to block the sale of tickets
outside the State of Louisiana.274 Initially, these provisions proved
to be ineffective and, actually, quite feeble.275 However, a federal
statute enacted in 1890 proved to be the coup de grace,276 and use
of the federal mail system was terminated.277
In addition, all efforts to win support for a renewal of the
lottery proved to be unsuccessful.278 The venture had survived for
some twenty-five years.279 However, in 1894, Louisiana itself had
finally joined the rest of the country in banning lotteries.280
Thereupon, the syndicate that operated the lottery moved its
operations to Honduras281 and resorted to “printing and
distributing tickets in the United States using private mail
couriers.”282 In 1895, Congress responded by eliminating this
loophole in the law.283 This ended the Louisiana Lottery in 1895.284
“[E]ventually the federal government stepp[ed] into outlaw
lotteries by the end of the nineteenth century.”285

million was distributed to winners annually” and the national scale
necessitated the use of the mail system to distribute these winnings).
271. Id. at 15.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 59 (stating that in a vote of “157,422
to 4,225[,]” Louisiana voters voted against a twenty-five year extension of the
lottery, and thus “exiled the Octopus”).
279. Id. at 55.
280. See SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 59 (explaining that the Louisiana
Lottery Company’s charter expired in 1894).
281. See id. (“The company pulled stakes for Honduras, renaming itself the
Honduras National Lottery.”).
282. Id.
283. See NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14, at 2-1 (“The federal
government outlawed the use of the mail for lotteries in 1890, and in 1895,
invoked the Commerce Clause to forbid shipments of lottery tickets or
advertisements across state lines, effectively ending all lotteries in the United
States.”). See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 59 (explaining that in 1895,
Congress criminalized “the interstate trafficking of lottery materials”).
284. Id.
285. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 38 (“By
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North Dakota’s experience is particularly interesting.286 After
its ouster from Louisiana, the Louisiana lottery company made an
effort to relocate to the State of North Dakota.287 Unfortunately,
the corruptive practices used in Louisiana were also used in North
Dakota, in an effort to relocate the lottery there.288 These practices
included buying legislators’ votes for $500 per vote to gain support
for the lottery.289
When the Pinkerton Detective Agency performed an
investigation that exposed this corruption, the corrupt practices
were made public.290 The Senate bill in favor of establishing the
lottery in North Dakota was indefinitely postponed.291 The
exposure of corruption motivated the Senate to enact an
amendment to North Dakota’s Constitution prohibiting
lotteries.292 The Senate’s revulsion by corruption endures to the
present.293 The aftermath of that historical upheaval is still
apparent in the North Dakota Constitution294 and in that state’s
statutory enactments.295 In the modern era, “[I]n only one state—
North Dakota—has the public consistently voted against a
lottery.”296 In 1986, an amendment to authorize a lottery was
proposed, which intended to alleviate the tax burden on the
citizens of North Dakota.297 However, when put to the general
public, it met strong resistance and was defeated in the 1986

1894[,] no state permitted the operation of lotteries. . . .”).
286. See Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 272 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting) (explaining
North Dakota’s unique history of gambling and the working of the state’s
gambling laws).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 268.
294. See id. at 266 (“[The North Dakota] state constitution expressly forbids
lotteries and games of chance ‘unless the entire net proceeds are devoted to
public-spirited uses statutorily specified as educational, charitable, patriotic,
fraternal, and religious.’”).
295. See id. at 267-68 (emphasis in original) (remarking that there is a still
a strong antigambling animus toward lotteries as evidenced by “[N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-28-02(2)], . . . prohibit[ion on] the sale, purchase, receipt, or
transfer of a chance to participate in a lottery, whether the lottery is drawn in
state or out of state, and whether the lottery is lawful in the other state or
country”).
296. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (distinguishing North Dakota as
the one state where the public has consistently resisted the lottery, despite its
popularity among the other states). See also CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING
HOPE, supra note 12, at 146 (indicating that North Dakota was the only state
to turn down a state-run lottery and depicting North Dakota’s resistance to
establishing a lottery by public vote in 1986 and 1988 in Table 8.1).
297. Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 268.
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general election.298
In 1993, North Dakota repealed its ban on lottery advertising,
provided that the advertisements related to a lottery that was
legal where it was operated.299 The repeal was cited as support for
the conclusion that “North Dakota’s legalization of advertising of
out-of-state lotteries cannot be reconciled with the majority’s
claimed public policy against [lotteries].”300 In reality, however,
although lawful lotteries remained dormant in the United States
for almost seventy years,301 illegal operations survived in many
parts of the country.302
3. The Rise Again
Legal lotteries returned with the passage of New Hampshire
legislation in 1964.303 By the end of 1988, lotteries existed in
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia.304 “Virtually every
state has required approval by both the legislature and the public
in a referendum. . . .”305 Of all the fifty states, North Dakota has
repeatedly rejected the enactment of lottery legislation.306
In modern times, state and provincial governments rely on
lottery revenue for a number of purposes, with supporters
emphasizing the general public welfare as the most significant
beneficiary.307 There are, of course, dissenters who tend to
question the validity of such claims.308 Nevertheless, over the past
several decades, lotteries have provided quite a steady flow of
298. Id.
299. Id. at 273.
300. Id.
301. See MCGOWAN, supra note 29, at 15 (asserting that lotteries were
outlawed until “New Hampshire became the first state to operate a lottery in
almost seventy years” in 1964).
302. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 39
(emphasis added) (“Illegal lotteries existed alongside official lotteries from at
least the nineteenth century, and, until the reemergence of state lotteries in
the 1960s and 1970s . . . . In the United States the two dominant illegal games
have been policy and numbers.”). See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 66
(describing the “policy wheel,” an illegal game that went underground as
states banned lotteries).
303. NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15. See also CLOTFELTER & COOK:
SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 22 (tracing the growth of lotteries to New
Hampshire in 1964, and explaining that “[b]eginning in New Hampshire in
1964, the lottery movement spread to New York and other northeastern states
before jumping to the West and Midwest[, and ] . . . [b]y 1989 lotteries were
operating in every section of the country”).
304. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 23. In 2011,
this number has now risen to 40. See also NAT’L SURVEY OF STATE LAW, supra
note 45.
305. NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15, at 3 (emphasis added).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 5.
308. Id.
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revenue into public coffers, and some states have earmarked
portions of the lottery proceeds for specific educational uses.309
A more incisive criticism focuses on the conception of “public
policy being made piecemeal and incrementally, with little or no
general overview.”310 One question that may be asked in this
context is: Well, what’s wrong with such an approach?311 One
answer may be that the NGISC does not seem to be convinced that
the approach of incremental and piecemeal development with little
or no general overview is an optimal one.312 The NGISC perceives
this approach as one which places “pressures on the lottery
officials” for a number of reasons articulated in its Final Report.313
In the NGISC’s opinion, these factors have had a critically
important impact on the public policy of every state that has
embraced lotteries.314 This viewpoint seems to be shared by two
lottery commentators of national stature.315 In all fairness,
however, these two commentators have not concluded that the
absence of a coherent overall gambling policy or the absence of a
specific lottery policy are necessarily the most significant factors
that impact lottery approval.316
This state of affairs is not an ideal societal equilibrium and
arguably, it is not equilibrium at all. Instead, it seems to
constitute an imbalance. Such a state of affairs seems to unevenly
allocate power to the lottery industry. The balance of power of the
population as a whole probably requires a more appropriate
impact of the opinions of elected officials. This would be healthier
for the public policy of any common-law democratic society overall.
309. See id. at 6 (stating that Georgia has attempted to address this concern
by mandating that “the sole designated recipients are programs for college
scholarships, pre-kindergarten classes, and technology for classrooms; [and
that] it is illegal to use the funds for any other purpose”).
310. Id. at 12.
311. One commentator has perceived certain consequences as a result of
this incremental development. See HERRMANN, supra note 44, at 121
(observing that gambling policies have developed incrementally, and that once
made legal, most forms of gambling have been quietly expanded, and
regulations that could limit revenue growth have been loosened).
312. NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15.
313. Id. (emphasis added) (“Authority . . . is divided between the legislature
and executive branches and further fragmented within each, with the result
that the general public welfare is taken into consideration only intermittently,
if at all.”).
314. Id. (“Few . . . states, have a coherent ‘gambling policy’ or even a ‘lottery
policy’ . . . [since oftentimes] . . . officials inherit policies and a dependency on
revenues that they can do little or nothing about.”).
315. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 43
(“[F]amiliarity itself may mollify opposition [to the lottery as evidenced by] the
apparent rise in approval of lotteries in states following adoption.”).
316. See id. (indicating that other factors for the increase acceptance of
lotteries is the “general liberalization of attitudes” in society on moral and
social issues and the “erosion of traditional (i.e. smalltown) American Values”).
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It would arguably be healthier than an industry-driven policy
juggernaut that exercises the greatest leverage in reaching tipping
points relating to significant changes in public policy.317
A newer development has been the cooperation of a number of
individual states in America banding together in order to offer
bigger overall jackpot prizes.318 This development has assisted
some states with populations that may be too small to support an
in-state lottery to share in lottery-generated funds along with
other American states with larger population sizes.319 In fact, the
first multistate lottery included New Hampshire, Maine, and
Vermont.320 This turned out to be a precursor to the largest
modern-day American, multi-state lottery games—Powerball321
and MegaMillions.322
B. Federal Lottery Laws
In earlier U.S. history, gambling policy was considered the
prerogative of state governments for many reasons. First, the
fundamental structure of American government under the U.S.
Constitution consisted of delegated powers.323 Moreover, the
legislative powers delegated to Congress in Article I, Section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, do not expressly include the regulation of
gambling activity.324 Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution specifically mandates that the “powers not
delegated to the United States . . . nor prohibited . . . to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”325
Accordingly, the federal government refrained from regulating

317. See, e.g., MALCOM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 247 (Little Brown
2000) (emphasis added) (explaining that “[t]he theory of Tipping Points
requires . . . that we reframe the way we think about the world”).
318. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“In recent years, the figures for
the top prize have continued to increase as multi-state consortia have been
formed with a joint jackpot.”).
319. SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 98.
320. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 113.
LOTTERY
ASSOCIATION,
321. See
About
Us,
MULTI-STATE
http://www.powerball.com/ pb_about.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (providing
information as to a multi-state lottery operated by Multi-State Lottery
Association (MUSL) that includes thirty-two states and Washington, D.C.).
322. See
History
of
the
Game,
MEGAMILLIONS,
http://www.megamillions.com/about/history.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2012)
(providing information as to a multi-state lottery operated by Multi-State
Lottery Association (MUSL) that includes forty-one states, U.S. Virgin
Islands, and Washington, D.C.).
323. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 216
(2009) (citations omitted) (describing the U.S. government’s powers as being
limited by the U.S. Constitution, and that “[a]ll powers not granted to it by
that instrument are reserved to the States or the people”).
324. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
325. Id. at amend. X.
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gambling for nearly a century.326
This self-imposed congressional restraint was a function of a
particular interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In this era,
Congress did not seem to perceive the Commerce Clause as an
enabling constitutional source of legal, regulatory power. A small
number of exceptions existed.327
Congress was given the constitutional power to “establish
Post Offices”328 and under the Commerce Clause to “regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.”329 Ultimately,
Congress’s perception of the potential constitutional regulatory
power embedded in those expressly enumerated powers changed.
This change was enervated by concerns raised by potential illegal
lotteries. The Louisiana Lottery served as a catalyst for the
unleashing of these activated federal legislative powers.330 As a
result, the use of the mail system for lottery facilitation was
targeted in an effort to cripple the interstate activities of the
Louisiana Lottery.331
In 1876, President Grant signed into law an act that imposed
legal sanctions on persons who circulated advertisements for
lotteries through the mail.332 Then, in 1890, Congress enacted a
law that proscribed the publication of any advertisements in
newspapers for lotteries.333 Predictably, the Louisiana Lottery
managers hunted for any lacuna that they could find in these antilottery statutes. As a result, the Louisiana Lottery managers

326. In 1988, acting under The Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3, Congress enacted the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
imposing on the several states a federal statutory obligation to negotiate
compacts in good faith with the Indian Tribes relating to gaming activities.
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(a) (2012). It also
created a federal cause of action empowering Indian Tribes to compel states by
action brought in the federal courts to perform those duties. Id. at § 2710(d)(7).
However, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996), the
Supreme Court of the United States struck down this grant of jurisdiction to
sue a state without its consent. The Court also made it abundantly clear that
these provisions of IGRA could not be validly used to enforce certain statutory
provisions of IGRA against a state official. See, e.g., Steven Andrew Light et
al., Spreading the Wealth: Indian Gaming and Revenue-Sharing Agreements,
80 N.D. L. REV. 657, 665 (2004) (“In effect, the Court invalidated Congress’s
carefully crafted compromise between state interests and tribal and federal
interests.”).
327. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 36 (“The
only exceptions . . . were a lottery to support the Continental Army in 1776
and a series of lotteries approved by the federal government between 1792 and
1842 to fund projects in the District of Columbia.”).
328. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
329. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
330. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 38.
331. Id.
332. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, 19 Stat. 90 (1876).
333. Act of September 19, 1890, ch. 908, 26 Stat. 465 (1890).
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moved the lottery operations outside the United States to
Honduras.334 Congress responded in 1894,335 by enacting
legislation that prohibited the importation “into the United States
from any foreign country . . . [of] any lottery ticket or any
advertisement of any lottery.”336
Seizure and forfeiture of all such articles was statutorily
commanded.337 Additionally, penalties of fines with a maximum of
$5,000 and imprisonment up to ten years, or both, were statutorily
empowered against violators.338 Then, in 1895, Congress enacted
an additional statute empowering the suppression of all lottery
traffic through national and interstate commerce.339 Use of the
mail was expressly prohibited in this act.340
These federal laws proved to be very effective as a result of
the severity of the restrictions imposed upon the operators of the
Louisiana Lottery.341 Additionally, the citizens of Louisiana had
become aware of the apparent bribing of state political leaders and
the extraction of exorbitant profits from operation of the lottery.342
In contrast, state beneficiaries were being shortchanged.343
Dishonest games apparently also came to light. Finally, in 1905,
as a result of statewide pressure from citizens, the Louisiana
legislature terminated state sponsorship of the lottery.344
Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions played a significant role in
this regard. The constitutionality of the congressional enactments
was sustained. Additionally, the judiciary ruled that the pertinent
acts of Congress were within the scope of the powers assigned to
Congress under the provisions of the U.S. Constitution. First, in
1892, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in Ex parte Rapier,345 that
the 1872 prohibition was a valid exercise of congressional power to
regulate the use of the mail.346 Then in 1903, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided, in Champion v. Ames,347 that Congress had the
power to regulate a “species of interstate commerce” that “has
334. SWEENEY, supra note 229.
335. Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. 53 Cong. Ch. 191, Mar. 2, 1985, 28 Stat. 963.
340. Id.
341. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 38.
342. See NGISC: Final Report, supra, note 14, at 2-1 (stating that bribery of
state and federal officials occurred during massive Louisiana lottery scandals).
See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 59 (stating that Louisiana’s lottery did
little to conceal its bribery of public officials).
343. SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 59.
344. See id. (“For a number of years the company operated outside the law,
until raids on these operations finally killed the Octopus in 1907.”).
345. Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
346. Id. at 135.
347. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
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grown into disrepute and has become offensive to the entire people
of the nation.”348 These decisions were perhaps the straws that
finally and completely broke the back of the Louisiana lottery.
Although there were no other legal state-authorized or stateoperated lotteries until New Hampshire began its sweepstakes in
1964, there were other lotteries that sought markets in the United
States. In addition to illegal numbers games in all major American
cities,349 the Irish Sweepstakes, which was created by the Irish
Parliament in 1930, had significant participants in the United
States as well.350 At first, the mail was used to promote and sell
tickets to customers in the United States.351 However, the 1895
federal law empowered the U.S. Post Office to intervene with legal
action to combat this use of the mail.352 Ultimately, any residual
success of the Irish Sweepstakes met with competition when
American states began to launch their own lotteries.
C. Criticism of Lotteries as Tax Vehicles
In every case where states have adopted lotteries, potential
revenues and the beneficial societal deployment of those revenues
have been the principal selling points.353 Certainly, Thomas
Jefferson does not seem to rank among the supporters of lotteries,
but seems to perceive them as quite an effective taxationsubstitution mechanism.354 The basis for this apparent perception
is the fact that payments are made voluntarily by those who
choose to play lotteries.355
Opponents of lotteries have adopted the language of taxation
and asserted that lotteries rank poorly according to conventional
criteria for judging taxes.356 Lotteries have also been compared
unfavorably to conventional taxes because of their alleged
instability and limited revenue potential.357 Furthermore,
348. Id. at 328.
349. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 39
(describing illegal numbers games in New York and other cities in the
northeast).
350. Id. at 38. See also SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 71 (describing the Irish
Sweepstakes as “one of the most popular” illegal lotteries in the United
States).
351. SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 71.
352. An Act for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic Through National and
Interstate Commerce and the Postal Service Subject to the Jurisdiction and
Laws of the United States, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963 (1895).
353. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 215
(“Revenue is the raison d’être of contemporary state lotteries.”).
354. Id. at 299.
355. Id.
356. See CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 215
(stating that lotteries are said to be a relatively inefficient source of revenue
owing to the high ration of administrative costs per dollar raised).
357. Id.
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opponents assert that lotteries are regressive, “preying on the
poor,” whether wittingly by marketing heavily in poor areas, or
unwittingly by simply offering a product that appeals to poor
people.358 One Maryland state senator who opposed the lottery
stated that “[l]otteries place an inordinate burden on the poor to
finance state government. But the poor are willing suckers, and
it’s hard to defend a group that doesn’t want to be defended.”359
Other criticisms of lotteries have been levied.360 One
commentator has suggested that lotteries are an inefficient way to
raise money for government.361 Lotteries are also open to the
charge of being regressive taxes,362 albeit “voluntary” ones, as
Thomas Jefferson suggested.363 The NGISC reserved many of its
harshest criticisms for state lotteries. It should be added that
lottery organizations were apparently not represented in the
membership of the commission.364 The NGISC strongly protested
against lottery advertising both for misleading people and for
encouraging them to participate in irresponsible gambling.365 The
NGISC also concluded that lotteries did not produce good jobs.366
Special criticisms were reserved for convenience gambling
involving lotteries, as the commission recommended that instant
tickets be banned and that machine gaming outside of casinos,
such as video lottery terminals at racetracks, be abolished.367
Some also criticize lotteries as inappropriate enterprises that
redistribute income by taking money from the poor and making
millionaires, suggesting that some of these new millionaires are
unprepared for their wealth and do not use it responsibly.368
358. Id.
359. Id. at 215, 299 n.11.2 (quoting Ronald Alsop, State Lottery Craze Is
Spreading, But Some Fear It Hurts the Poor, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1983).
360. See NGISC: LOTTERIES, supra note 15 (emphasis added) (“The focus on
convincing non-players to utilize the lottery, as well as persuading frequent
players to play even more, is the source of an additional array of criticisms.”).
361. See SWEENEY, supra note 229, at 133 (explaining that the lottery is the
most expensive “tax” for states to collect).
362. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra 15 (contending that lottery tickets are
regressive since they are the same price to everyone regardless of each
individual’s income, and they are “implicit” tax since all revenue received from
selling them goes to the state).
363. CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 299 n.11.
364. See Members, NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N (Aug. 3, 1999),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/members/members.html (providing a list of
members).
365. NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14, at 3-5.
366. See id. at 3-4 (stating that lottery play is highest in economically
disadvantaged communities and lottery advertising promotes luck over hard
work).
367. Id. at 3-18.
368. See Clarence Page, Life Lessons From Sad Lotto Winners, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 4, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-04/news/ct-oped-0404page-20120404_1_mega-millions-ticket-lotto-missouri-lottery
(discussing
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IV. THE EVOLUTION FROM PAST TO PRESENT OF PUBLIC POLICY
APPLICABLE TO LOTTERIES IN AMERICA
A. Lotteries as a Species of Gambling Generally
In states where lotteries are prohibited, a constitutional or
statutory definition of what constitutes a lottery may not have
been provided by either the constitution or the state’s statutes.369
However, a lottery may be defined as a scheme in which money is
paid in some form for the chance of receiving money or a prize in
return.370 The fact that there is sufficient consideration to qualify
for the formation of a valid contract does not per se prevent a
bargain from being a wager.371 In essence, it is characteristic of a
lottery that one party pays a definite sum in return for a promise
of receiving a greater sum or greater value than that actually paid
dependent upon a certain contingency.372 Therefore, although
there may be sufficient consideration, there is no agreed exchange
of performances.373 Of course, although a lottery displays the

potential problems confronting lottery winners).
369. See, e.g., Troy Amusement Co., 28 N.E.2d at 211 (illustrating the
shortcomings of antilottery constitutional provisions and laws for being too
vague in defining what constitutes a lottery, and failing to provide a detailed
description of what exactly is prohibited).
370. See People v. Hecht, 3 P.2d 399, 401-02 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.
1931) (holding that where the winners of a lottery are determined, not by
chance, but at the will of the promoter, the enterprise is, nevertheless, a
lottery); People v. Wassmus, 182 N.W. 66, 67 (Mich. 1921) (concluding that the
elements of a lottery are consideration, chance, and a prize); Knight v. State ex
rel. Moore, 574 So. 2d 662, 666-68 (Miss. 1990) (refusing to extend the
definition of “lottery” to bingo even though chance, a prize, and consideration
were present because it is not popularly thought of as a lottery and, therefore,
the statute permitting bingo was not unconstitutional); Harris, 869 S.W.2d at
62-63 (holding that a lottery consists of “consideration, chance and prize,” and,
therefore, games requiring skill, such as blackjack or 21, do not constitute
lotteries); State v. Emerson, 1 S.W.2d 109, 111 (Mo. 1927) (determining that
any game or plan in which “anything of value is disposed of by lot or chance);
CONtact, Inc. v. State¸ 324 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Neb. 1982) (holding that certain
“pickle cards” constituted lotteries because the element of chance existed since
the tickets were drawn from a tub, despite the fact that the winning numbers
were predetermined); Cole v. Hughes¸ 442 S.E.2d 86, 89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)
(affirming the dismissal of a counterclaim concerning a joint venture to
purchase lottery tickets because “[t]he parties to the case at hand paid money
and entered into an agreement, the outcome of which was dependent upon the
Virginia Lotto, a contingent event, a chance, a lot, however ‘high tech.’”);
Harris v. Econ. Opportunity Comm’n of Nassau Cnty., Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d 672,
674-76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that a raffle was an illegal lottery, and
hence the charitable organization could not be compelled to award the prize);
Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412, 414 (Wyo.
1977) (determining a raffle to be a lottery, and thus it was illegal and void).
371. Williams, 573 P.2d at 414.
372. State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 867 P.2d 1034, 1051 (Kan. 1994).
373. Chenard, 387 A.2d at 600.
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characteristics of a wager or bet, not every wager is necessarily a
lottery.374
In order for a scheme to be deemed to be a lottery, three
elements must exist. First, there must be a distribution of gain by
chance, commonly referred to as a prize.375 Second, the prize must
be awarded by lot or chance.376 Third, the participants must have
given consideration for a chance of winning the prize.377 Unless all
three elements are present, the lottery laws have no application.378
A lottery, it seems, must depend on a purely fortuitous event.379
But even if elements of skill and chance both exist in a game, it is
a lottery if the element of chance predominates.380 Moreover, it is
not an indispensable requirement that, to constitute a lottery, the
prize must be in money.381 Essentially, “whenever the scheme of
distribution is such that—if the payment of the prize were in
money it would be a lottery[—then], it will be equally so although
374. Yellow-Stone Kit v. State, 7 So. 338, 338 (Ala. 1890); Wilkinson v. Gill,
74 N.Y. 63, 67 (N.Y. 1878).
375. State ex rel. Stephan, 867 P.2d at 1040.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. State ex rel. Stephan v. Parrish, 887 P.2d 127, 137 (Kan. 1994)
(determining that the Kansas constitutional provision banning lotteries, but
permitting bingo, did not authorize legislature to define bingo to include
instant bingo pull-tab game, and such legislation was thus unconstitutional);
Knight, 574 So. 2d at 666-68 (refusing to classify certain games as lotteries
simply because chance, prize, and consideration were present when such
games were not popularly thought of as being lotteries); Harris, 869 S.W.2d at
62-63 (holding that lottery consists of “consideration, chance and prize,” and
that legislation allowing gambling falling within the ambit of lotteries was
unconstitutional); CONtact, Inc., 324 N.W.2d at 806-08 (holding that certain
“pickle cards” constituted lotteries within the meaning of state statute
permitting certain sponsors to hold lotteries because the element of chance
was met); McFadden v. Bain, 91 P.2d 292, 294 (Or. 1939) (recognizing that the
essence of a lottery is a chance for a prize for a price); Commonwealth of Pa. v.
Irwin, 636 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Pa. 1993) (ruling that video blackjack, poker, and
other games were not gambling machines per se where they lacked the
element of reward because the player could not win more money than he or
she gambled).
379. Stoddart v. Sagar, 2 QB 474, 18 Cox 165, 169-70 (DC 1895). See also
People v. Reilly, 15 N.W. 520, 521 (Mich. 1883) (explaining that lotteries
consist of people buying tickets hoping to win a prize solely based on chance);
Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 64 (holding that games requiring just chance and no
skill, such as bingo and keno, were lotteries under Missouri law, but games
requiring skill, such as poker and blackjack, did not constitute lotteries); Cole,
442 S.E.2d at 89 (stating that any wagers or bets based on chance are
unlawful); Williams, 572 P.2d at 414 (determining that chance is an essential
component to the lottery).
380. Commonwealth v. Plissner, 4 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Mass. 1936); Harris,
869 S.W.2d at 62.
381. See Seattle Times Co. v. Tielsch, 80 Wash. 2d 502, 506 (Wash. 1972)
(en banc) (describing lottery awards as constituting either money or other
property).
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the prize[ is] payable in land or in [goods].”382
A variety of raffles and gift enterprises have been found to be
obnoxious enough to offend the public policy principles against
lotteries. For example, a bargain by which a purchaser pays a
fixed sum in return for a promise to convey a number of lots or
items—determined by the drawing of lots—has been held legally
invalid.383 Similarly, a raffle, which permitted the plaintiff to buy a
chance for a price of $5 to win a forty-acre plot of land was ruled to
be a void gaming bargain.384 As a result, the plaintiff could not
recover when the defendant drew plaintiff’s stub and then, upon
382. People v. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (N.Y. Mag. Ct. 1939). See also
Nelson v. Bryant, 220 S.E.2d 647, 648 (S.C. 1975) (holding where the parties
to the suit agreed independently that if respondent won an automobile at a
drawing held in conjunction with a fair, they would make a particular
disposition of it, it was unnecessary to determine whether the drawing
constituted an illegal lottery since the transaction between the parties was
separate from the drawing, and did not depend upon any illegality); Williams,
572 P.2d at 413 (holding that gambling contracts are unenforceable).
383. See Glennville Inv. Co. v. Grace¸ 68 S.E. 301, 302-03 (Ga. 1910)
(determining that an agreement for lots constituted a lottery because the
participants paid the same amount of money, and the number and value of
lots given to them were based solely upon chance); Lynch v. Rosenthal, 42 N.E.
1103, 1103-06 (Ind. 1896) (holding contract to be invalid where the
participant’s likelihood of receiving more or less value for his investment was
premised on chance); Commonwealth of Mass. v. Ward, 183 N.E. 271, 271-72
(Mass. 1932) (holding that a miniature shovel, purportedly to be used for the
customer’s amusement, which permits the one paying for the privilege of
picking up and retaining valuable objects, where the objects seldom are
obtained, offends a statute against lotteries); Glover v. Malloska¸ 213 N.W.
107, 107-08 (Mich. 1927) (declaring a contract to be invalid where the
defendants printed tickets for a monthly drawing for a car and sold them to
their customers to pass on to their customers and clients, regardless of
whether they purchased anything); Emerson, 1 S.W.2d at 110-13 (upholding
prison sentence for lottery contract that called for a payment plan of $1 a week
until customers reached $55 at which time the furniture would be delivered,
but at least once a week, the store would draw names and deliver $55 worth of
furniture without additional payments); Retail Section of Chamber of
Commerce of Plattsmouth v. Kieck, 257 N.W. 493, 493-95 (Neb. 1934)
(declaring a plan illegal when it consisted of businesses issuing a coupon with
each 25-cent purchase and then holding a drawing once a week in which the
award was a ticket redeemable for a store’s merchandise); Mkt. Plumbing &
Heating Supply Co. v. Spangenberger, 169 A. 660, 660-61 (N.J. 1934)
(concerning a scheme in which a store allowed customers to enter into a raffle
for various prizes after they spent at least $25 in a specified time period);
People v. Miller, 2 N.E.2d 38, 38-40 (N.Y. 1936) (holding scheme was unlawful
lottery when customers purchased movie tickets and also received raffle ticket
for drawing in which money was the prize); Harris, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 673-77
(holding that raffle was an illegal lottery and thus the sponsor could not be
compelled to award prize); Allebach v. Godshalk, 9 A. 444, 446 (Pa. 1887)
(holding sale and purchase of land worthless when it was based upon lottery
contract).
384. Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412, 41315 (Wyo. 1977).
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receiving late entries, conducted a completely new drawing
thereby causing the plaintiff to lose his prize.385
Moreover, the giving of a ticket for the drawing of prizes has
been held illegal, where the ticket was obtained by the purchase of
goods,386 the purchase of an admission ticket,387 or on merely
attending an auction.388 Additionally, slot machines and other
video or computer games are generally held to offend antilottery
statutes or constitutional provisions where they do not involve
skill, but pay winners solely based on luck.389 On the other hand, it
has been held that the receipt of “Lady Luck” coupons by
customers after eating their meal was legally different.390 The
receipt of the “Lady Luck” coupons, entitling the customers to
draw for prizes, occurred subsequent to the meal.391 Participation
in the drawing was therefore absolutely free.392 The absence of the

385. Id.
386. Holmes v. Saunders, 250 P.2d 269, 269-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952);
Bloodworth v. Gay, 96 S.E.2d 602, 602-03 (Ga. 1957); Glover, 213 N.W. at 10708; State v. Powell, 212 N.W. 169, 169-70 (Minn. 1927); Emerson, 1 S.W.2d at
110-11; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth, 257 N.W. 493,
493-95 (Neb. 1934); Mrkt. Plumbing & Heating Supply Co., 169 A. at 660-61;
Miller¸ 2 N.E.2d at 39-40; Featherstone v. Indep. Serv. Station Ass’n of Tex.¸
10 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. Ct. App. 1928).
387. Blair v. Lowham, 276 P. 292, 292-94 (Utah 1929); State v. Danz, 250 P.
37, 37-39 (Wash. 1926).
388. Maughs v. Porter, 161 S.E. 242, 242-46 (Va. 1931).
389. See Loiseau v. State, 22 So. 138, 138-40 (Ala. 1897) (holding that a slot
machine constitutes a lottery); Lee, 163 So. at 490 (same); Thompson v.
Ledbetter, 39 S.E.2d 720, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (same); State v. Vill. of
Garden City, 265 P.2d 328, 332 (Idaho 1953) (same); State v. Barbee, 175 So.
50, 56-57 (La. 1937) (same); Commonwealth v. McClintock, 154 N.E. 264, 26465 (Mass. 1926) (same); Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 58-66 (collecting cases declaring
that slow machines are lotteries, and ruling that record evidence was unclear
respecting newer video games as to whether they constituted pure games of
chance, and were thus lotteries, or whether they were games of skill, and
hence not within the constitutional prohibition against lotteries); MPH Co. v.
Imagineering, Inc., 792 P.2d 1081, 1084-85 (Mont. 1990) (refusing to uphold
the contract between the manufacturer and purchaser because electronic
poker/keno game was a slot machine, and so the contract was void because it
was for an illegal machine); State v. Marck, 220 P.2d 1017, 1018-19 (Mont.
1950) (declaring that slot machines were banned because they constituted
lotteries); Ex Parte Pierotti, 184 P. 209, 209-11 (Nev. 1919) (holding that the
slot machines fell under the state’s anti-gambling laws); Hendrix v. McKee,
575 P.2d 134, 137-40 (Or. 1978) (holding that employment agreement was
unenforceable where employee was hired to make devices that he knew were
illegal); State v. Coats, 74 P.2d 1120, 1120 (Or. 1938) (determining that both
pinball machines and slot machines are lotteries); Queen v. State, 246 S.W.
384, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922) (holding that slot machines constitute
lotteries); Bhd. of Friends, 247 P.2d at 796 (determining that slot machines
only constitute lotteries when they are played for prizes).
390. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S.2d at 797-98.
391. Id.
392. Id.
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element of consideration prevented the scheme from being a
lottery.393
Constitutional prohibitions on lotteries do not universally
include definitions of what constitutes a lottery.394 Moreover,
where constitutional or statutory definitions of a lottery are
enacted, such definitions are not necessarily interpreted in a
universally identical, similar, or predictable manner. In instances
where lotteries are defined by a state’s constitution or statutorily,
common-law principles of statutory interpretation apply to such
definitions.395 Similar principles of statutory interpretation also
apply to state statutes that enact constitutionally permissible
exceptions to the constitutional prohibitions relating to lotteries.
For example, a state constitution may prohibit lotteries. It
may not, however, have included a constitutional definition of
what constitutes a lottery. Additionally, the legislature may not
have defined lotteries either. In such a situation, the judiciary is
constitutionally obligated to determine what does and does not
constitute a lottery.396
Of course, numerous states have relatively recently legalized
state-run lotteries,397 and have declared that it is consonant with
their public policy to obtain funds for such worthwhile purposes,
such as subsidizing educational programs.398 In such instances,
393. Id.
394. See In re Request of the Governor, 12 A.3d 1104, 1111 (Del. 2009)
(acknowledging that the Delaware Supreme Court fails to define the term
“lottery”).
395. See Seymour H. Moskowitz, Symposium on Integrating Responses to
Domestic Violence: Reflecting Realty: Adding Elder Abuse and Neglect to Legal
Education, 47 LOY. L. REV. 191, 208 (2001) (contending that lottery statutes
provide a good opportunity for “statutory interpretation and creative
lawyering).
396. See, e.g., Lichter v. U.S., 334 U.S. 742, 779 (1948) (“[I]t is essential that
. . . the respective branches of the government keep within the powers
assigned to each by the Constitution.”).
397. See U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 423 (1993) (explaining that
Virginia has developed a monopoly on a state lottery); N.Y. State Broad. Ass’n
v. U.S., 414 F.2d 990-99 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that New York passed a
constitutional amendment in 1966 authorizing a state lottery); Della Croce v.
Ports, 550 A.2d 533, 533-35 (N.J. 1988) (although New Jersey has legalized
lotteries, as well as numerous other forms of gambling, activity falling outside
the statutes’ scope, such as an agreement to sell an interest in a lottery ticket
at more than the ticket’s purchase price, remains illegal); Hughes¸ 465 S.E.2d
at 828-29 (Va. 1996) (explaining that the fact that the state lottery was legal
did not legalize an arrangement to split the winnings).
398. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. III, § 39(b) (directing that any lottery
revenues be distributed to public education at the primary, secondary, and
higher levels); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 6-b (directing that lottery proceeds
should only be used to for education and administrative purposes); OHIO
CONST. art. XV, § 6 (directing proceeds to be used for education); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 8880.1 (2012) (declaring that proceeds from the lottery would be used
to supplement educational funding); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4815(b)(2)(c)
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lotteries falling outside the express parameters of the statutes399
remain prohibited.400 Moreover, to the extent that a federal public
policy is expressed in the cases,401 in the statutes banning the
broadcast of lottery information, and in regulations made
pursuant to these provisions, it is clear that lotteries are
prohibited except as authorized by the states.402 Thus, federal
antilottery statutes sustain and reinforce the public policy of those

(2012) (directing that lottery proceedings be used to fund programs for the
treatment, education, and assistance of compulsive gamblers and their
families, among other things); FLA. STAT. §§ 24.102(1), (2)(a) (2012) (directing
that the net proceeds from the lottery be used to add additional funding for
public education); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-27-32(d) (2012) (directing that any
proceeds from the state lottery be used to provide funding for educational
programs and purposes); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-905(2) (2012) ((directing that
lottery proceeds are to be distributed to the various school districts in
proportion to that district’s average daily attendance rate); IOWA CODE
§§ 99G.39(3)(a), 99G.9A (2012) (providing that lottery proceeds are to be
distributed to Vision Iowa, to the General Fund, to assist Veterans, and to the
school infrastructure fund); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-812(2) (2012) (providing that
lottery proceeds are to be distributed to the “Education Innovation Fund, the
Nebraska Opportunity Grant Fund, the Nebraska Environmental Trust Fund,
the Nebraska State Fair Board, and the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance
Fund”); N.J. REV. STAT. § 5:9-2 (2012) (directing lottery proceeds to be used to
fund state institutions and education); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1601 (Consol. 2012)
(directing for lottery proceeds to be used for education); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 461.540 (2012) (setting forth the various areas that lottery proceeds will help
fund, such as the creation of jobs, furthering the economic development of
Oregon, and financing public education); W. VA. CODE § 29-22-18 (identifying
the state interests that are to be supplied with additional funding by the
lottery proceeds, some of which include the School Building Debt Service Fund
and the Education, Arts, Sciences, and Tourism Debt Service Fund). See also
Brown v. Cal. State Lottery Com., 284 Cal. Rptr. 108-13 (Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that the plaintiff, who was unable to choose his own lottery numbers
due to a malfunctioning machine, was not a third-party beneficiary of the
contract between the state lottery commission and the store since the
California State Lottery Act was passed as a means of providing additional
funding for education, and not to assist people “who wish to engage in a
capricious fling with fortune”).
399. E.g., private lotteries.
400. See Harris, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 673 (holding that a raffle sponsored by
charitable organization was an illegal lottery and, therefore, the court refused
to compel the sponsor hand over the prize); Keene Convenient Mart, Inc. v.
SSS Band Backers, 427 S.E.2d 322, 324-25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
when an error caused the randomness of an otherwise legal raffle to be
compromised, the raffle fell within the ambit of gambling prohibitions and, as
such, the proceeds were to be turned over the county).
401. See generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(discussing federal public policy concerns regarding broadcasting).
402. See Broadcasting Lottery Information, 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012)
(prohibiting radio and television advertisements of lotteries); Exceptions
Relating to Certain Advertisements and Other Information and to state
conducted lotteries, 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (2012) (exempting state lotteries from
the broadcasting ban).
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states that ban lotteries.403
In the modern era, although some form of lottery is legal in
many states, absent legislation specifically authorizing lotteries,
they remain subject to the same legal objection as any gambling
bargain.404 Gambling exacerbates the tendency that so many
people seem to display. Too many people seem to be willing to
venture their money in the face of a significantly high probability
that they will lose it. Furthermore, the risk of loss of their money
is not counterbalanced by the prospect of a sufficiently substantial
benefit because the prospect of gain is too remote. Gambling has
been banned historically because it tends to impose unacceptably
high risks of serious financial injury on certain classes of the
community.405
Moreover, the NGISC did not appear to detect irrefutable
evidence to support the presence of counterbalancing specific
community benefits derived from lotteries.406 However, “[t]here is
much anecdotal evidence to support the notion that gambling . . .
provides economic benefits for the communities that allow it.”407
This anecdotal evidence, which has apparently not been confirmed
by formal data evidencing support,408 helps to explain the
following observation. A vast number of states have enacted laws
authorizing lotteries that are run by, or on behalf of, state or local
government in order to raise funds for education or other public
purposes.409
However, this modern trend towards more and more
extensive state creation of lotteries has not changed the societal
foundation of reprobation towards lotteries. In the more recent
past, lotteries have been resoundingly prohibited in many states
403. See generally Edge Broad. Co.¸ 509 U.S. at 418 (refusing to allow a
North Carolina radio station from advertising the lottery because of North
Carolina’s ban on lotteries despite the fact that Virginia radio stations
broadcasting in North Carolina were able to broadcast such advertisements);
Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954) (refusing to ban
the advertisements of give-aways because such programs were not considered
to be lotteries).
404. See Williams v. Weber Mesa Ditch Extension Co., Inc., 572 P.2d 412
(Wyo. 1977) (concluding that while the lottery is legal, gambling debts are still
unenforceable).
405. See Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 58l (holding that the legislature cannot
constitutionally permit certain forms of legalized gambling because it
constituted a lottery in violation of state constitution); Williams, 572 P.2d at
412 (holding that wagers are against human welfare).
406. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (emphasis in the original) (“[I]t
appears that the public’s approval of lotteries rests more on the idea of
lotteries reducing the potential tax burden on the general public than it is on
any specific instance of relief.”).
407. HERRMANN, supra note 44, at 87 (emphasis added).
408. Id. at 88.
409. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (“[M]ore common is the
‘earmarking’ of lottery money for identified programs”).
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as a form of gambling.410 In light of this norm of reprobation, laws
that legalize any form of gambling, including lotteries, are treated
by the courts as exceptions to the general policy against
gambling.411 Such lottery-enabling laws will therefore continue to
be very strictly construed.412 The unabated strength of the state
public policy against gambling predicates that statutes and
regulations that impact legalized gambling must be construed
strictly and narrowly.413 The judiciary’s goal is to limit the powers
and rights claimed under such legislative authority to the
boundaries set in them by the legislature.414
In this regard, statutorily authorized gaming entities are the
intended beneficiaries of statutes requiring the fair and equitable
dissemination of gambling information to the public.415 Statutes
legalizing gambling have the purpose of authorizing, licensing,
and controlling gaming activities in order to stimulate and
promote the growth of the particular state’s economy.416 The
statutory intention is ultimately to foster and assure that honest
wagering occurs.417 This is intended to preserve the public’s
confidence in perceiving that this is the case.418 The overall
intention is to strictly regulate all parties involved in gaming
operations in order to preserve the integrity and credibility of
these operations.419

410. 38 AM. JUR. 2D, Gambling §§ 5, 10 (2012).
411. See Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Travelers Express Co., 745 F. Supp.
1266, 1270 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (referring to laws permitting some forms of
gambling as exceptions).
412. 38 AM. JUR. 2D, Gambling §§ 17, 18 (2012).
413. Citation Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten, 910 P.2d 281, 287 (N.M. 1995) (“[W]hen
considering whether the legislature has authorized use of Power Bingo
devices, we must, in light of New Mexico’s strong public policy against
gambling, construe the terms of the Act narrowly.”). See also Ramesar v.
State, 224 A.D.2d 757, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (citation omitted) (“Public
policy continues to disfavor gambling; thus, the regulations pertaining thereto
are to be strictly construed.”).
414. See West Indies, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 214 P.2d 144, 146-47,
154 (Nev. 1950) (limiting rights granted to licensees to conduct gambling by
holding that the right to conduct gambling activities does not confer the right
to bring an action to collect gambling debt).
415. Sports Form, Inc. v. Leroy’s Horse & Sports Place, 823 P.2d 901, 903
(Nev. 1992).
416. St. Charles Gaming Co., Inc. v. Riverboat Gaming Comm’n, 648 So. 2d
1310, 1317 (La. 1995).
417. Moya v. Colo. Ltd. Gaming Control Comm’n, 870 P.2d 620, 622 (Colo.
1994).
418. Id.
419. Mastro v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 667 N.E.2d 594, 597 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
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B. Lotteries by Any Other Name Nevertheless Remain Lotteries420
Judicial determinations as to whether or not activities
constitute
lotteries are issues of substantive
law.421
Categorizations by the operators of the activity are not legally
dispositive because the issue is one of substance rather than
terminology.
1. Bingo as Lotteries
Courts are split on the issue as to whether or not bingo per se
constitutes a lottery within the meaning of state antilottery
constitutional or statutory provisions. Arguably, a majority of the
decisions have concluded that bingo is a lottery.422 A minority of
420. The same may be said of roses. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2 (quoting “What’s in a name? that which we call
a rose [b]y any other name would smell as sweet . . . .”).
421. See generally Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel & Casino, 109 F. Supp. 2d
324 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (determining whether New Jersey or Pennsylvania’s
substantive laws applied to the diversity case in which the plaintiffs claimed
the defendant resort and casino failed to pay them the $1 million that they
had allegedly won).
422. See City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435, 436-37 (Ala. 1994)
(deciding that municipal ordinance that permitted nonprofit organizations to
use instant bingo to raise money was unconstitutional since instant bingo did
not constitute “bingo” as intended by the amendment to the Alabama
Constitution, but instead constituted a type of lottery and was thus banned by
the constitution); State v. Crayton, 344 So. 2d 771, 774 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977)
(holding that while bingo is a lottery and contrary to the law of the state, an
illegal activity can be taxed); Pruit v. State, 557 N.E.2d 684, 690-91 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that “bingo played for a prize received by chance or lot in
exchange for consideration is a lottery and prohibited by [statute]”); Parrish,
887 P.2d at 136-37 (explaining the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision that the
legislature exceeded its authority by passing a bill permitting instant bingo
since instant bingo lacks the same characteristics of regular bingo, and is “far
more similar to slow machines, punchboards, and other forms of gaming”);
Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 64 (holding that bingo, keno, and pull-tab games, among
other games involving no skill, constitute lotteries within the meaning of
Missouri Constitution, and thus legislation authorizing such types of gambling
is unconstitutional); Army Navy Bingo, Garrison No. 2196 v. Plowden, 314
S.E.2d 339, 340 (S.C. 1984) (holding that bingo is a lottery and there is no
right to conduct bingo under either the state constitution or under the U.S.
Constitution); Bingo Bank, Inc. v. Strom, 234 S.E.2d 881, 883 (S.C. 1977)
(holding that a game of “Bingo Bank” was in violation of the constitutional
provision prohibiting lotteries except the “game of bingo,” since there were
material differences between “Bingo Bank” and the “game of bingo” in that
“Bingo Bank” was “played with one player . . . . [t]he cards [were] all identical
and the winner [did not] depend upon covering the squares in any
configuration”); Sec’y of State v. St. Augustine Church/St. Augustine Sch., 766
S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tenn. 1989) (holding unconstitutional certain statutes
enacted in an attempt to legalize bingo under the auspices of various
charitable, religious, and fraternal and other non-profit organizations because
the state constitution’s “terms are sweeping and absolute[, and] [i]t simply
removes from the General Assembly the authority to authorize lotteries for
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court decisions has held otherwise in well-reasoned opinions.423
The present day legal position, in light of the widespread adoption
of state-run lotteries, arguably draws a discernible distinction
between a “lottery,” “bingo,” and other games of chance in such a
way that lotteries stand apart from other games of chance.424
2. “Bank Nights” as Lotteries
During a period in American history, a variety of so-called
“bank night” plans became popular among the operators of movie
theaters.425 Often these plans conferred upon purchasers of an
admission ticket the right to participate in drawings for prizes.426
In some instances, the winner was required to be present at the

any purpose—charitable, public, private, or any other.”).
423. See People v. 8,000 Punchboard Card Devices, 191 Cal. Rptr. 154, 155
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing that in 1976, the California electorate passed
legislation permitting “cities and counties to provide for bingo games, but only
for charitable purposes,” and that it further expanded the definition of bingo
three years later); Carroll v. State, 361 So. 2d 144, 147-48 (Fla. 1978) (citation
omitted) (affirming that “while the legislature cannot legalize any gambling
device that would in effect amount to a lottery . . . the legislature, in its
wisdom, has seen fit to permit bingo as a form of recreation, and at the same
time, has allowed worthy organizations to receive the benefits.”); St. John’s
Melkite Catholic Church v. Comm’r of Revenue, 242 S.E.2d 108, 113 (Ga.
1978) (citation omitted) (citing the “[t]he “bingo amendment” to the Georgia
Constitution which states that “the operation of a nonprofit bingo game . . .
shall be legal.”); Bingo Catering & Supplies, Inc. v. Duncan, 699 P.2d 512, 513
(Kan. 1985) (upholding the constitutionality of an amendment that placed
strict restrictions on bingo operations, which were legalized despite the
Kansas Constitution’s prohibition on lotteries); Bender v. Arundel Arena, Inc.,
236 A.2d 7, 15 (Md. 1967) (holding that bingo and slot machines were
historically exempted from the laws making gambling illegal); Frank v. Dore,
635 So. 2d 1369, 1374 (Miss. 1994) (explaining that “[i]t would be [a mockery
of the law] . . . to hold that while [one statute] legally permits charitable bingo
games, . . . [another statute] completely bars any form of court assisted
recovery for participants in legally conducted bingo games”). See generally
Knight v. State ex rel. Moore, 574 So. 2d 662 (Miss. 1990) (holding that the
constitutional provision banning lotteries was not violated by legislation
permitting certain forms of bingo after it considered the popular meaning of
the terms “lottery” and “bingo” to determine whether the former includes the
latter, and determined that it does not).
424. See Knight, 574 So. 2d at 669 (deciding bingo is not a lottery).
425. See Goodwill Adver. Co. v. Elmwood Amusement Corp., 133 A.2d 644,
647-48 (R.I. 1957) (finding that there was no additional consideration than the
normal price of the ticket because patrons did not have to pay more than the
regular ticket price and the drawing was open to nonpatrons as well).
426. See, e.g., People v. Cardas, 137 Cal. App. Supp. 788, 789-90, 793 (Cal.
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1933) (explaining that although some states found “bank
nights” to be illegal lotteries where the tickets to win prizes were distributed
when a product was purchased, in the case at bar, the theatre was distributing
tickets to both ticket purchasing customers as well as non-paying visitors, and
the winning number was announced both inside and outside the theatre so the
tickets were seen as a promotional effort to increase profits).
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theater, while in others, physical presence was not mandatory.427
Of course, these schemes were supposedly promotional.428 The
ostensible business purpose was to increase the volume of business
at theatres.429 In some cases, such schemes were held not to
constitute lotteries.430 The legal rationale focused on proof that the
total consideration that each individual customer of the theater
exchanged was the routine price of the ticket purchased for normal
admission.431 There was therefore allegedly no proof of any
additional consideration over and beyond the usual transaction for
the industry.432 However, most of the decided cases held that bank
night schemes were lotteries and therefore illegal.433
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. See Cardas, 137 Cal. App. Supp. at 792 (examining similar cases in
which the tickets were only available to paying customers, and so part of the
consideration paid was for the prize ticket); St. Peter v. Pioneer Theatre Corp.,
291 N.W. 164, 170 (Iowa 1940) (deciding that “it is entirely possible that the
act, specified by the promisor as being sufficient in his discretion to constitute
consideration for and acceptance of his promise, might have no monetary
value and yet constitute a legal consideration for the promise”); State v.
Eames, 183 A. 590, 591 (N.H. 1936) (providing that “[w]hile it is abundantly
clear . . . that it is perfectly legal to make a gift the recipient of which is
selected by chance, it is equally clear that one may not obtain immunity from
prosecution under the lottery law by resort to the device of a pretended gift”);
Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Corp, 293 N.Y.S. 745, 747 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1937) (permitting recovery premised on promissory estoppel because the
plaintiff had attended the bank night and signed the book, which constituted
consideration, so defendant could not then refuse to pay on a basis of
illegality); People v. Shafer, 289 N.Y.S. 649, 654 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1936) (finding
where the party merely registers without payment of any admission charge,
the courts are more prone to find that no lottery exists); Goodwill Adver. Co.,
133 A.2d at 647-48 (holding bank night plan was legal because it was open to
nonpaying participants and theater patrons whose admission price was not
consideration for a chance at the drawing); State ex rel. Dist. Atty. Gen. v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 95 S.W.2d 310, 310-12 (Tenn. 1936) (affirming a
lower court ruling that where a theatre held a “bank night” open to anyone,
not just paying patrons, it was not a lottery or prohibited game under
statutory law since there was no consideration).
432. See State ex rel. Dist. Atty. Gen. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 95
S.W.2d 310, 310-12 (Tenn. 1936) (determining that since the “bank night” was
open to anyone, not just paying patrons, there was no consideration and it was
thus not a prohibited lottery).
433. See Affiliated Enters. v. Waller, 5 A.2d 257, 260-62 (Del. 1939)
(declining to enforce a contract because it required patrons to sign a book and
be present at the theatre, which constituted consideration, and it thus created
an illegal contract); State v. Mabrey, 60 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Iowa 1953) (deciding
that “[i]t did not cease to be a lottery because some were admitted to play
without paying for the privilege, so long as others paid for their chances”);
Hardy v. St. Matthew’s Cmty. Ctr., 240 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Ky. 1951) (concluding
that even if a lottery is illegal pursuant to a statute, if the purchasing party
pays for her ticket and she is selected in the drawing, the offering party must
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3. Lotteries for Charity
The number of states that enacted constitutional provisions
prohibiting lotteries raised an important question. This question is
whether or not certain forms of wagering authorized by the
legislature constitute a lottery proscribed by the particular state
constitution.434 Irrefutably, the specific language of the
comply with the contract and deliver the winnings); Commonwealth of Ky. v.
Malco-Memphis Theatres, Inc., 169 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Ky. 1943) (“If the chance
of winning a prize is part of the inducement to purchase goods or tickets of
admission, the scheme is a lottery.”); Doskey v. United Theatres, Inc., 11 So.
2d 276, 278-79 (La. Ct. App. 1942) (finding that the court could not determine
the merits of a case because the lottery was illegal, and so the plaintiff could
not recover the winnings from the lottery); Commonwealth of Mass. v. Wall, 3
N.E.2d 28, 30 (Mass. 1936) (holding “that the price must come from
participants in the game in part at least as payments for their chances and
that the indirect advantage to the theatre of larger attendance is not in itself a
price paid by participants.”); Sproat-Temple Theatre Corp. v. Colonial
Theatrical Enter., 267 N.W. 602, 602-03 (Mich. 1936) (affirming the lower
court’s injunction against a competing theatre’s lottery because it violated a
statute that prohibited lotteries since there was indirect consideration paid to
the theatre through the increased attendance and associated financial gains);
State ex rel. Hunter v. Omaha Motion Picture Exhibitors Ass’n, 297 N.W. 547,
549-50 (Neb. 1941) (“A game does not cease to be a lottery because some, or
even many, of the players are admitted to play free, so long as others continue
to pay for their chances.”); Furst v. A. & G. Amusement Co., 25 A.2d 892, 893
(N.J. 1942) (deciding that the contract under which the plaintiff sought to
recover was invalid and unenforceable because it comprised a statutorily
illegal lottery because consideration was present since some patrons paid for
their ticket and received entry, and other patrons experienced a hardship in
having going to the theatre to enter their names); State v. Jones, 107 P.2d 324,
326-27 (deciding that a “Bank Night” was a lottery because the three elements
of a lottery—consideration, chance, and prize—were present, and patrons who
purchased tickets, as well as non-patrons, were entered into the drawing and
that was found to be adequate consideration); Miller, 2 N.E.2d at 39-40
(affirming that in purchasing a ticket at the regular price, the patron was also
purchasing a chance to win the prize therefore the operation was an illegal
lottery); Troy Amusement Co., 28 N.E.2d at 214-15 (deciding that even though
the patrons paid the regular ticket price for admission, the increased
patronage and revenue comprised sufficient consideration and constituted an
illegal lottery); McFadden, 91 P.2d at 295 (“If it is a lottery as to those who do
pay, it necessarily is a lottery as to those who do not pay for their chances.”);
Commonwealth of Pa. v. Lund, 15 A.2d 839, 845-46, 848 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940)
(deciding that even though some patrons paid for tickets in the drawing and
others did not, the operation constituted an illegal lottery); State v. Robb &
Rowley United, Inc., 118 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (deciding that
the small variation in the scheme where non-paying patrons were entered into
the drawing along with the ticket paying patrons still constituted
consideration in an illegal lottery); Stern v. Miner, 300 N.W. 738, 739-40 (Wis.
1941) (deciding that although paying and non-paying patrons could enter the
lottery, it was nonetheless an illegal lottery, and the contract was void and
unenforceable).
434. See generally Ex parte Pierotti, 184 P. 209 (Nev. 1919) (explaining slot
machines do not constitute lotteries as defined in the state constitution); Bhd.
of Friends, 247 P.2d at 796 (providing that the earlier constitution was written
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constitutional measure controls the judiciary’s interpretation of its
meaning. The fact that the enacted statutes license or permit
lotteries for charitable, religious, civic, educational, or fraternal
purposes is not an automatic “safe harbor” for such statutory
enactments.435 Despite their beneficent purposes, such statutes
will be ruled to be unconstitutional under a state constitutional
provision whenever the statutes have sought to create
constitutionally forbidden lotteries.436
V. THE LEGAL IMPACT ON PUBLIC POLICY OF LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES IN STATE LOTTERY LAWS
Of course, the argument can be made that public policy with
respect to lotteries has not been fundamentally changed by recent
state legislative changes in lottery laws. The precision of the
legislation certainly circumscribes its legal reach. State
legislatures have targeted the operation of lotteries within the
state by restricting their operation to the particular state alone.
This is of course a function of state sovereignty. The clear cut legal
effect has been to create a state monopoly in each individual state
that has taken this course of action. However, the creation of these
state-lottery monopolies may nevertheless have left state common
law intact. State substantive common-law public policy principles
may have survived intact for the following reasons.
First, the fundamental and unanimous individual state
motivation for the legalization of lotteries has been the
substitution of a voluntary tax to take the place of involuntary
taxation.437 “Voters want states to spend more, and politicians look
at lotteries as a way to get tax money for free.”438 The efficacy of
this argument has been reinforced by the intensity of modern
political pressures created by almost unprecedented economic

broadly to adjust for developments over time, and that slot machines are
illegal as against the constitutional provision); State v. Tursich, 267 P.2d 641,
641 (Mont. 1954) (finding a state “purporting to authorize the use of
punchboards as trade stimulators upon the purchase of a use tax stamp, is
unconstitutional as an attempt to authorize lotteries” in violation of the state
constitution).
435. See Bhd. of Friends, 247 P.2d at 796 (determining that statute granting
charitable organizations exemption from the constitutional ban on gambling
was unconstitutional).
436. See, e.g., id. (finding that regardless of the charitable function of an
organization, if the operation runs contrary to the state constitution, it will be
deemed illegal).
437. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (emphasis added) (“The principal
argument in every state to promote the adoption of a lottery has focused on its
value as a source of ‘painless’ revenue: players voluntarily spending their
money (as opposed to the general public being taxed) for the benefit of the
public good.”).
438. Id. (citation omitted).
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stress.439 The crucible of this stress requires politicians to traverse
a passage between Scylla440 and Charybdis,441 commonly referred
to as being “between a rock and a hard place.”442 It consists of
excruciating political pressure on states to either increase
taxation, in order to maintain public programs at current levels of
generosity,443 or cut these programs.444 The concomitant public
pain and suffering may routinely lead to political upheaval. So,
wherever possible, politicians tend to select the alternative of
raising taxes using the “free” mechanism, rather than cutting
public programs.445
Additionally, another critically important set of factors play a
role. In its Report on Lotteries,446 the NGISC has indicated that
lottery promoters have argued that “because illegal gambling
already exists, a state-run lottery is an effective device both for
capturing money for public purposes that otherwise would
disappear into criminal hands and also for suppressing illegal
gambling.”447 This may be perceived as the engine that propels
legislative conduct to legalize state-run lotteries, since this
decision implicates legislative public policy to legalize the lesser of
two evils.
Therefore, the lottery structure of the forty or so states that
have enacted lottery statutes has been designed to put lottery
operations in place as part of each state’s administrative law
structure.448 State lotteries are part of the administrative agency

439. Id.
440. See HAMILTON: MYTHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 222 (stating that “[in
mythology, this was a perilous sea passage between] the whirlpool of
implacable Charybdis and the black cavern into which Scylla sucked whole
ships”).
441. Id.
442. See, e.g., Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea,
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM,
http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/between+the+devil+and+the+deep+blue+s
ea (last visited Sept. 26, 2012) (explaining that in some places this dilemma is
referred to as being “between the devil and the deep blue sea”).
443. See NGISC: Lotteries, supra note 15 (explaining that once lotteries
have been introduced, they become a necessary evil to continue state funding
of public benefits).
444. Id.
445. See id. at 2 (stating that politicians view lotteries as a means of
attaining tax money for free).
446. Id.
447. See id. at 3 (citations omitted) (explaining that the creation of a staterun lottery has resulted in the elimination of illegal lotteries throughout the
state, except for New York City).
448. See Clotfelter et al., supra note 22, at 19 (emphasis added) (“Owing to
its structure and management orientation, the typical state lottery authority
has evolved into a new breed of governmental agency[, in which] [v]irtually all
state lotteries conform to a single basic model . . . .”).
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structure of each state’s executive branch of government.449 In the
interest of completeness on this point, it is acknowledged that
these state administrative agencies do not function under the
authority of the Government of the United States. They are
therefore not subject to the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act.450 However, state lottery authorities—being administrative
agencies of the state that created them—are undeniably subject to
applicable provisions of the United States Constitution.451
In any event, the widespread state embrace of lotteries raises
fundamental questions relating to substantive common-law public
policy. The most important question may be whether or not a
state’s embrace of the lesser of two evils thereby transforms that
evil in any substantive way. Does this lesser evil now cease to be
an evil? Additional questions would be whether or not “lotteries
[are] a more or less harmless form of recreation[?]”452 And whether
or not “lottery play is a benign activity[?]”453 And, does the
legislative legalization of lotteries now justify “taxing lottery
products [no] more heavily than liquor or tobacco. . . .”454 The
judiciary’s answer to these questions seems to be a resounding
“no.”455
The judiciary’s conclusion seems to be that the lesser of two
evils nevertheless remains an evil. Its status of being lesser than
some greater evil does not per se transform its fundamentally evil
genetic code. Therefore the widespread state creation of lotteryoperation monopolies that now exist throughout the United States
coexist “cheek by jowl” with the prior fundamental judiciallyenunciated public policy. That prior public policy disfavoring
gambling in general and lotteries in particular456 remains intact.457
It is an American legal phenomenon.458

449. Lotteries-Lottery
Administration,
LIBRARY
INDEX,
http://www.libraryindex.com/pages/1604/Lotteries-LOTTERYADMINISTRATION.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).
450. See 5 U.S.C. §551 (2012) (defining an agency subject to the act as an
authority of the United States government).
451. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating that state action must conform
to the constitution).
452. Clotfelter et al., supra note 22, at 21.
453. Id. at 22.
454. Id.
455. Stanley, 2003 WL 22026611, at *19. See also Meyer, 626 N.W.2d. at 267
(citations omitted) (explaining that when courts are reviewing contracts, they
will turn to the state’s constitution and laws to determine whether the
contract is “inconsistent with fair and honorable dealing, contrary to sound
policy, [or] offensive to good morals[,]” and if it is, the court will not enforce the
contract on the grounds that it is contrary to the public good).
456. Meyer, 626 N.W.2d. at 267.
457. Id.
458. See, e.g., Clotfelter et al., supra note 22, at 19 (emphasis added) (“The
lottery is in a sense the state governments’ biggest business venture, and a
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VI. THE CURRENT AND FUTURE PUBLIC POLICY LANDSCAPE
Condemnation of gambling generally, and of lotteries in
particular, has arguably remained the dominant fundamental of
public policy well into the modern era.459 In this regard, the
opinion of one commentator seems to be that perhaps the
NGISC460 “dropped the ball.”461 The commentator expressed a
number
of
laments.462
Nevertheless,
the
commentator
acknowledged that “the Commission asserted that individual
states best knew how to regulate themselves. . . .”463 This is
inevitable because under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution,464 the regulation of gambling remains vested in the
several states.465 There is, of course, the factor of the regulation of
Indian gaming.466 However, Congress has certainly acknowledged
the constitutional legal power of the Tenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.467 Congress has acknowledged this palpable legal
reality in enacting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
(“IGRA”),468 “which recognizes tribal sovereignty while giving
states a significant role in setting the parameters of gaming
within their borders.”469 It is unlikely therefore that Indian Tribes
would seek to create and implement lotteries routinely, in
competition with state lotteries, without a prior compact with each
rather problematic one given widespread ethical and pragmatic concerns about
gambling.”).
459. See Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 267 (recognizing that the state legislature
still has a significant anti-gambling stance concerning lotteries). See also
NIBERT, supra note 229, at 114 (“[T]raditional religious condemnation of
gambling and lotteries ostensibly was supported by a conservative,
Republican-controlled Congress, which, in 1996, created the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission . . . to examine the social implications of
gambling.”).
460. NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14.
461. See NIBERT, supra note 229, at 115 (“The Commission submitted a
number of recommendations to the President and Congress for consideration
but . . . economic exigencies largely eclipsed moral appeals for fairness and
justice.”).
462. See id. (discussing the commission’s failure to discuss the recent
economic and political events that led to “the emergence of lotteries and other
forms of gambling as forms of revenue creation and economic development”).
463. Id. (emphasis added).
464. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
465. See id. (inferring that since there is no enumerated power over
gambling, that power is vested in the states).
466. See Rand, supra note 61, at 971 (citation omitted) (explaining that
since Native American tribes are considered sovereign nations, they
“ordinarily are not subject to the strictures of state law”).
467. See supra note 278 and accompanying discussion.
468. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. §2701 (2006).
469. Rand, supra note 61, at 971 (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
(“Under IGRA, tribes may conduct gaming only in those states that ‘permit[]
such gaming for any purpose by any person’ . . . [so] . . . state law in the first
place dictates the permissible scope of Indian gaming.”).
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state in which such Indian lotteries would be created and would
operate.
The viewpoint of the commission unavoidably suggests that
the tension in the state law of each of the individual states that
have legalized lotteries will remain unchanged.470 This tension
consists of the antipathy between the inexorable advancement of
lottery legalization by state legislatures on the one hand, and the
well-established essentially universal public policy that continues
to reprobate gambling generally and lotteries in particular on the
other hand.471 So the well-established principle of law that lottery
contracts are, as a general rule, illegal agreements remains intact.
Such agreements remain legally null and void.
Currently, and for the perceivable future, arguably no court
will allow itself to be made an instrument of enforcing obligations
arising out of an agreement or transaction that is illegal. Courts
will continue to leave parties who are equally contaminated where
they find them.472 A number of states still have constitutional or
statutory provisions prohibiting the promotion or conduct of
lotteries or the sale of lottery tickets.473 These prohibitions are
then subjected to enacted exceptions empowering state monopolies
to conduct these operations.474 The exceptions have authorized or
sponsored lotteries for specific purposes at one time or another in
the state’s history, such as those lotteries that provide sources of
revenue for charitable, educational, or religious purposes.475 The
widespread legalization of lotteries throughout the United States
and in other countries such as Canada, has created other tensions
between those states where lotteries are lawful and those states
where lotteries remain prohibited.476
In recent years, a common practice has developed, especially
on those occasions when large prizes are offered by various state
lotteries. The practice is for friends, relatives, and coworkers to
pool their resources and purchase several tickets with the
understanding that any winnings will be distributed equally

470. See NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14, at 3-1 (suggesting that state
law will not adhere to other policies).
471. See, e.g., CLOTFELTER & COOK: SELLING HOPE, supra note 12, at 11
(comparing state lotteries to Jekyll-and-Hyde due to the conflict between the
traditional opinion concerning gambling in which it is seen as a vice and the
view that gambling is simply an amusement).
472. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 310 (2012).
473. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 44 (2012).
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 433-35 (determining that a federal antilottery statute did not violate the First Amendment although it barred a
business licensed in a state where lotteries were legal from advertising on the
radio when the lottery advertisements were also heard by residents of another
state, a state in which the lottery was illegal).
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among them.477 These agreements to jointly participate in lotteries
and share in the proceeds, if any, are in many instances informal
and oral.478 They are of course vulnerable to legal challenges
leveled at their formation. For example, are these “informal
arrangements” legally void of mutual assent or consideration? To
put it bluntly, are these agreements legally unenforceable? Or, are
they also snared by the provisions of the statute of frauds?479 If
they are, would these agreements also be subject to the
ameliorating impact of equitable estoppel and promissory
estoppel?
The courts that have confronted these issues have reached
differing conclusions. Some courts have refused enforcement of
these agreements on the ground that such agreements violate the
public policy of the state where the parties to the joint venture
reside.480 The fact that the activity of actually playing the lottery
in issue is lawful in the state where the purchase was made has
not always saved the agreement from legal nullification.481
Other courts have permitted enforcement of such agreements
between the parties, reasoning that the parties are not engaged in
gambling between or amongst themselves.482 Instead, such courts
have been persuaded that the parties are merely agreeing to
participate jointly in a specific enterprise.483 Since such an
enterprise is lawful in the state where the lottery tickets are sold,
the courts in some states have concluded that no public policy of
the state in which the participants to the joint venture reside is
being violated.484
477. See Maffea v. Ippolito, 247 A.D.2d 366, 366-67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(concerning an agreement between relatives to split lottery winnings).
478. See id. at 366 (describing the agreement as an oral agreement that
occurred at an informal family party).
479. See generally Matthew J. Gries, Note, Judicial Enforcement of
Agreements to Share Winning Lottery Tickets, 44 DUKE L.J. 1000 (1995)
(discussing briefly the possibility of the statute of frauds being applied to
matters concerning lottery pools).
480. See Hughes, 465 S.E.2d at 826-27 (determining that the agreement
violated the policy of North Carolina, where the parties resided).
481. See id. at 827-29 (holding a joint venture agreement entered into by a
North Carolina resident void as violative of a North Carolina antigaming
statute since the consideration for the agreement was money won at gambling,
the legal lottery in Virginia).
482. Fitchie v. Yurko, 570 N.E.2d 892, 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
483. Id.
484. See Talley v. Mathis, 453 S.E.2d 704, 705-06 (Ga. 1995) (concluding
that it was not contrary to Georgia’s public policy for the parties to agree to
travel to Kentucky in order to purchase lottery tickets with pooled money and
then share any winnings, and that such an agreement is enforceable in
Georgia); Kaszuba v. Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 1987) (holding that a
contract was lawful when it called for one individual to travel to Illinois with
his friend’s money to purchase lottery tickets and then bring them back to his
friend in Indiana, where lotteries were illegal because no Indiana law
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Of course, provisions authorizing and regulating lotteries
remain strictly construed in states that have authorized the
creation of lotteries. Additionally, such provisions are subject to
interpretation in conjunction with other anti-gambling statutes.
As a result, assertions of illegality may nevertheless be leveled at
agreements arising from participation in authorized lotteries.
Moreover, although a lottery may be authorized in one
jurisdiction, the legal validity in one state cannot legally transfer
to the sale of lottery tickets in a jurisdiction that forbids such
sales.485 This would violate state sovereignty outright.
Nevertheless, some courts have expressed concern that the
refusal to enforce contracts to share in the returns from a winning,
state-promoted lottery ticket on public policy grounds is
problematic.486 This refusal of court enforcement makes such
agreements perilous. It can be perceived as permitting
unscrupulous holders of winning tickets to renege on their
agreements. Permitting such unscrupulous actors to escape
enforcement of these agreements into which all parties freely
entered merits rational inquiry and reflection.487 The question
arises as to whether or not this failure to enforce these agreements
confers any measureable benefit on the non-enforcing state.488
Arguably, an agreement to divide the proceeds from a
prohibited such conduct); Miller v. Radikopf, 228 N.W.2d 386, 387-91 (Mich.
1975) (enforcing agreement between the parties to split the proceeds of any
winnings gained from the two free tickets they received from the Irish
Sweepstakes for every 20 tickets they sold in Michigan despite the fact that
selling sweepstakes in Michigan was illegal since it would be contrary to
public policy not to enforce the agreement because it was not illegal under
Irish law to pay the proceeds to the holders of tickets or illegal under Michigan
law to be paid the proceeds voluntarily); Pineiro v. Nieves, 259 A.2d 920, 921
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) (permitting, by statute, New Jersey residents
to possess lottery tickets lawfully bought in lottery states, and noting that
public policy was not offended by agreements to share the proceeds of a lottery
ticket); Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 426-32 (Tex. 1967) (holding that
Texas public policy was not violated by an agreement between two individuals
in which one of them would travel to Mexico to buy Mexican lottery tickets and
that they would split any winnings since it was a Mexican contract and the
winnings were to be collected in Mexico).
485. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 60 (2012).
486. See Pearsall v. Alexander, 572 A.2d 113, 117 (D.C. 1990) (stating that
since the lottery is legal, the failure to enforce agreements to split proceeds
would only benefit individuals who are unjustly benefiting by trying to keep
another’s winnings for themselves); Kaszuba v. Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind.
1987) (believing that it would be bizarre to prevent Indiana residents from
entering into an agreement to split the proceeds from an Illinois lottery when
the lottery was legal in Illinois and the purchase occurred there).
487. See Pearsall, 572 A.2d at 117 (determining that agreements to split
lottery proceeds should be enforced because failure to enforce them would
result in unscrupulous individuals being allowed to keep someone else’s share
of the winnings).
488. Id. at 117.
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successful, legal lottery ticket creates an enforceable oral contract
as a number of courts have found.489 Valid legal support is derived
from the evidence of all the facts and surrounding circumstances
presented to the courts. Characterization of the conduct of the
parties as a joint venture or informal partnership agreement to
participate in and divide the profits from lottery ticket purchases
is not necessarily legally irrational.490
489. See id. (finding that the parties had entered into an oral argument to
share the proceeds from the winning lottery ticket); Johnson v. Spence, 286
A.D.2d 481, 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (finding an oral agreement between a
girlfriend and her boyfriend to share any lottery prizes).
490. See Pearsall, 572 A.2d at 117 (holding that the record supported the
existence of an oral agreement between two friends to share equally in the
proceeds from a winning District of Columbia lottery ticket based on their
conduct on the evening that the ticket was purchased); Fitchie v. Yurko, 570
N.E.2d 892, 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that there was sufficient evidence
of an informal partnership agreement between the claimants and the ticket
holder to entitle them to an equal share in the winnings); Pando v. Fernandez,
118 A.D.2d 474, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that summary judgment
for the recipient of the proceeds from a winning state-operated lottery ticket
on the ground of the impossibility of the proof of a condition precedent, saintly
intervention, was inappropriate where one version of the terms of an oral
partnership agreement advanced by the minor could be proven in a court of
law); Yates v. Tisdale, 3 Edw. Ch. 71, 76 (1838) (holding that there was
sufficient evidence presented of a clear, positive, and unconditional agreement
to sell a share of the lottery ticket, and that the purchaser was entitled to the
same share of the prize); Hamilton v. Long, 588 N.E.2d 942, 943 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that there was sufficient, competent, and credible
evidence to support the finding of an enforceable oral contract between the
recipient of the value of an automobile won during her appearance on a “Cash
Explosion” television show and two employees who had purchased the “entry”
lottery ticket which entitled the holder to appear on the show); King v.
Thomas, No. CA 90-9, 1990 WL 127935, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1990)
(holding that lower court’s conclusion that the parties had agreed to jointly
purchase and share equally in the proceeds from both Super Lotto and kicker
lottery tickets was a well-reasoned decision based upon probative and credible
evidence); Johnson, 286 A.D.2d at 482 (holding that live-in girlfriend stated
cause of action for breach of oral agreement by alleging that she and her
partner had agreed to purchase lottery tickets jointly and to share proceeds of
any winning lottery ticket); Johnson v. Johnson, 191 A.D.2d 257, 259 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993) (holding an agreement that was signed and witnessed
demonstrated the parties’ intent to split any possible winnings from a lottery
ticket, and that the said agreement was further supported by consideration in
that the parties agreed to “surrender their respective rights to claim the entire
prize . . . and . . . to share equally the related tax liabilities”); Stepp v.
Freeman, 694 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an informal
group in which coworkers pooled their resources to purchase lottery tickets
when the jackpot reached $8 million had entered into an implied contract from
which a member would not be dropped unless he expressed an intent to leave
group to the organizer or the organizer dropped him from the group for failure
to pay, and which was breached when the organizer unilaterally dropped the
coworker from group after they had an unrelated personal dispute); Domingo
v. Mitchell, 257 S.W.3d 34, 41 (Tex. App. 2008) (holding that coworker’s
agreement to advance another coworker’s share of a group payment for lottery
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Certainly, where sufficient evidence necessary to prove the
existence of an enforceable oral contract to divide lottery winnings
is presented, a court may validly affirm a motion for summary
judgment by the parties alleging its existence.491 Some courts have
presumed the existence of an agreement to distribute the proceeds
from a winning, legal lottery ticket between parties who pool
resources to purchase lottery tickets.492 This is not an
insurmountable task for courts by any stretch of the legal
imagination. The same proportion of the parties’ contribution to
the purchase price of all tickets, the “pooling” agreement, if you
like, can be the resolution mechanism.493 It can simply require
proof that the percentage of the purchase price was contributed in
order to make the purchase or purchases, unless expressly agreed
otherwise.494

tickets, and the coworker’s agreement to reimburse her, was an exchange of
promises that was sufficient for consideration to create a binding contract).
491. See Maffea, 247 A.D.2d at 367 (holding that alleged oral agreement
made at informal family gathering to share grand prize in state lottery if
either party won was unenforceable due to the lack of evidence that party who
eventually won the lottery had assented to agreement at the time of the
gathering or any time following it); Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 270 (holding that
since the parties had simply promised to share any possible winnings, without
actually pooling their money to purchase the tickets, the defendants had not
converted the plaintiffs’ property when the plaintiffs did not contribute to the
funds used to purchase the tickets).
492. See Cahn v. Kensler, 34 F. 472, 472-73 (C.C. W.D. Mo. 1888)
(discussing that the court’s belief that the parties had split the cost of the
lottery tickets was what led it to determine that the two parties had jointly
owned the winning lottery ticket); Lomberk v. Lenox, 19 Phila. Co. Rptr. 562,
570 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1989) (inferring that there was an agreement to split the
proceeds from a winning lottery ticket because of the parties’ conduct).
493. See Lomberk, 19 Phila. Co. Rptr. at 573 (holding that when people pool
their money in order to buy lottery tickets, the winnings must be split so that
each party receives the same proportion of the winnings as their contribution
to the pool, except when there is an express contract that the winnings are to
be retained by the purchaser).
494. See Cahn, 34 F. at 473 (discussing that if the parties had jointly
purchased the two lottery tickets with funds equally contributed by both
parties, such a purchase was determinative of the claimant’s recovery of a onehalf share of the winnings, thus presuming that an agreement to equally
divide the winnings was formed under such circumstances); Lomberk, 19
Phila. Co. Rptr. at 573 (holding that when people pool their money in order to
buy lottery tickets, the winnings must be split so that each party receives the
same proportion of the winnings as their contribution to the pool, except when
there is an express contract that the winnings are to be retained by the
purchaser).

Do Not Delete

2012]

2/9/2013 4:27 PM

Lotteries and Public Policy

99

A. Two Contrasting Cases
In Cole v. Hughes,495 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
declined to exercise in rem jurisdiction over the ticket itself.496
This made sense because common-law courts will not reach
decisions that the court itself is legally incapable of enforcing.497
The Cole court ruled that it was legally precluded by the facts from
enforcing any in rem adjudication over legal or equitable title to
the lottery ticket.498 This was the case because the ticket was
located outside the jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts.499
The ticket was in fact located in Virginia.500 Unavoidably,
therefore, a decision by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
declaring ownership of the ticket would be nullified if the Virginia
courts disagreed with the North Carolina court’s decision.501
The counterclaim by the defendants sought adjudication of
“the rights of the parties under the alleged joint venture
agreement.”502 The Cole court clearly had jurisdiction over this
issue for the following reasons. First, at the time of the litigation
“all parties to the agreement [were] North Carolina residents, and
they entered into the venture in North Carolina.”503 The Court
therefore applied North Carolina public policy to the joint venture
in issue and declared “their joint venture to be illegal.”504
This determination invoked North Carolina’s antigambling
and antilottery public policy. The Court made it clear in no
uncertain terms that “North Carolina public policy is against
gambling and lotteries.”505 Inevitably therefore, the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of
the defendants’ counterclaim “because it sought to enforce a
contract or joint venture which is illegal and against the public
policy of North Carolina.”506
In Talley v. Mathis,507 the Supreme Court of Georgia reached
an antithetical conclusion508 based upon the facts of that
495. Cole, 442 S.E.2d at 86.
496. See id. at 89 (“It is indisputable that [the lottery ticket in issue] had
been presented to the lottery authorities in Virginia, and that it is there
now.”).
497. See id. (“We do not have the jurisdiction to assert, or the power to
enforce . . . a decision [of the North Carolina courts] in Virginia.”).
498. Id.
499. See id. at 88 (citations omitted) (“In rem jurisdiction may not be
invoked over property located outside this state.”).
500. Id. at 89.
501. Id. at 88.
502. Id. at 89.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id. (citations omitted).
506. Id.
507. Talley, 453 S.E.2d at 704.
508. Id. at 706.
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controversy.509 In essence, the Supreme Court of Georgia
concluded that the contract to purchase the winning ticket was
made in Kentucky.510 It was a contract between the actual
purchaser on the one hand, and the State of Kentucky on the
other.511 Furthermore, the contract was perfectly legal in
Kentucky.512 Moreover, such contracts were perfectly legal for
persons to enter into in the State of Kentucky.513 The facts of the
case established that two Georgia residents agreed that the
defendant’s daughter, who lived in Kentucky, would buy lottery
tickets for them with money supplied by the Georgia residents.514
When a ticket the defendant’s daughter purchased won a six
million dollar prize in the Kentucky lottery, the defendant told the
plaintiff that the ticket belonged to his daughter and others, and
not to the plaintiff.515 The plaintiff filed suit against the other
Georgia resident, the Georgia resident’s daughter, and others.516
Both the trial court and the court of appeals held that the
agreement between the parties violated Georgia’s public policy and
refused to enforce it.517 However, the Supreme Court of Georgia
reversed the court of appeals.518
First, the Supreme Court of Georgia quoted the Georgia
antigambling statute which made gambling agreements void.519
The Supreme Court of Georgia however noted that the parties’
bargain did not involve a situation where one of the parties had to
lose something, which is a hallmark of a gambling agreement.520
The Supreme Court of Georgia emphasized that the only gambling
contract that might exist in the instant case was that between the
State of Kentucky and the holder of the winning ticket.521 Since
the State of Kentucky was not a party to the suit, and since that
state had, in any event, agreed to pay the holder of the winning
ticket, therefore the agreement was enforceable in Kentucky.522
509. Id.
510. See id. (determining that the appellant was simply paying an agent to
purchase a lottery ticket in Kentucky where it constituted a lawful act).
511. Id. at 705.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 705-06; Talley v. Mathis, 441 S.E.2d 854, 855 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994).
515. Talley, 441 S.E.2d at 855.
516. Id.
517. See id. at 855 (rebuffing the plaintiff’s argument that a 1992
amendment to the Georgia Constitution authorizing the lottery indicated a
change in the state’s public policy, thereby refusing to discuss the
amendment’s impact).
518. Talley, 453 S.E.2d at 706.
519. Id. at 705.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
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The lower courts had therefore erred in relying on the Georgia
antigambling statute to nullify the parties’ agreement.523
Secondly, the Supreme Court of Georgia acknowledged that
the agreement remained legally vulnerable.524 In this respect, the
agreement could nevertheless be nullified if it were immoral,
illegal, or otherwise in violation of the public policy of Georgia.525
This was the case in light of a Georgia state statute that had
codified this fundamental common-law principle. However, the
lottery was lawful in Kentucky.526 Moreover, there were no
assertions before the court that the parties had agreed illegally to
purchase a Kentucky lottery ticket in Georgia.527 Nor were any
assertions made to the court that there was any conduct or any
facts that violated Georgia law or public policy.528
On the contrary, the proof presented to the court established
that the ticket had been purchased lawfully in Kentucky.529
Indeed, the Georgia residents had merely used the Kentucky
resident as an agent to do an act that was entirely lawful under
the laws of Kentucky.530 The Supreme Court of Georgia made it
quite clear that there was nothing illegal where a Georgia resident
personally travelled to Kentucky and bought a lottery ticket in
Kentucky while being there.531 Such conduct did not implicate
illegal activity of any kind. The Supreme Court of Georgia
therefore concluded that there was nothing illegal or legally
improper on the facts of the case.532 The Georgia residents had
simply contributed money to the joint purchase of a lottery ticket
to be purchased by a third party who lived in Kentucky.533
The Supreme Court of Georgia cited a relatively similar
Indiana case in which the Indiana courts had upheld the legality
of a significantly similar agreement.534 In the Indiana case cited by
the Supreme Court of Georgia, two Indiana residents agreed that
one of them would, on behalf of the other, travel to Illinois and
purchase lottery tickets in Illinois for the first party.535 The
purchase of lottery tickets in Illinois was perfectly legal for
persons in Illinois to do.536 The Indiana courts therefore ruled that

523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705-06.
Id.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kaszuba, 506 N.E.2d at 1.
Id. at 2.
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the agreement was not unlawful.537
The Supreme Court of Georgia pointed out that a refusal to
enforce the agreement would not benefit the citizens of Georgia.538
In fact, such a refusal by the Supreme Court of Georgia would in
fact reward duplicitous conduct on the part of the alleged bargain
breaker. Such conduct would itself violate Georgia’s public
policy.539 The court thus reversed the decision of the lower court.540
This reversal permitted the plaintiff to pursue enforcement of the
alleged contract in Kentucky.541 This approach may very well be
the emerging view with respect to cases arising under similar
circumstances.
There similarly seems to be disagreement over the validity of
any agreement to share the proceeds of a lottery ticket or parimutuel bet. This is the case in spite of the fact that the wager may
be perfectly legal in the state where it was made. There is a
divergence of authority as to whether such agreements are
enforceable,542 or not.543 Individual state sovereignty will
perpetuate these antithetical decisions by the courts in the
individual states.
VII. CONCLUSION
“[It] is a common failing of mankind, never to anticipate a
storm when the sea is calm.”544 The current financial prosperity
and widespread embrace of lotteries could conceivably mask
invisible subconscious psychological undercurrents that could
prove to be ominous for the future.545 Every state would do well to
remember the pendulum nature of lotteries in light of their history
in American law.546 States must always be wary and remember
that it is “when times [are] quiet that they could change.”547 In
537. Id.
538. Talley, 453 S.E.2d at 706.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. See Szadolci v. Hollywood Park Operating Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356,
359 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (dismissing a cause of action in which the
plaintiffs’ shares in a ticket fell outside the scope of the statutorily authorized
pari-mutual betting, and thus constituted illegal gambling).
543. Id.
544. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 1, at 129.
545. See HERRMANN, supra note 44, at 121 (emphasis added) (“The
expectations and beliefs of the participants in gambling policy are continually
shaped by both the history and the evolution of gambling . . . [which] . . .
continues to experience the consequences of its nineteenth and early twentieth
century history of corruption and scandal.”).
546. See Mike Roberts, The National Gambling Debate: Two Defining
Issues, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 579, 583-86 (1997) (discussing the rise and fall of
efforts to legalize lotteries and gambling).
547. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 1, at 129.
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light of the history of lotteries in American law, the changeable
nature of public policy is inevitable.548 It is also significantly
perpetual.549 The quintessence of legal norms applicable to human
concepts of appropriate national and individual state behavior and
philosophy will continue to evolve. After all, evolution inevitably
implicates change in varying degrees.550
It seems, therefore, that at present, no clear and present
danger to the widespread conduct of lotteries by the vast majority
of States in America lurks on the horizon. At least, no such danger
has reached the stage of galvanizing immediate, or not too distant
future, action by any American state to curtail lotteries. Moreover,
the NGISC551 in its report552 seemed to strike a note of some
comfort in concluding that, with two exceptions,553 “[t]he
Commission recommends to state governments and the federal
government that states are best equipped to regulate gambling
within their own borders. . . .”554 Therefore, should such danger
arise, American states are seemingly equipped and presumably
capable of meeting it.555
In this regard, any present or future obligations placed upon
the courts to address legal issues pertaining to lotteries will be
met by current fundamental common-law principles applicable to
illegal contracts as a genre. These fundamental common-law
principles applicable to such contracts are transcendent. They are
as follows. The public policy of any given state will continue to be
discerned by the judiciary. This discernment will be accomplished
by the judiciary’s examination of the particular state’s constitution
and its statutory enactments. These are the two basic sources of a
state’s public policy.
It is therefore safe to assert that the judiciary will continue to
confidently execute its constitutionally assigned task to identify,
interpret and apply the fundamental common-law concept of
public policy. As a result, the courts will not affirmatively assist
parties to an illegal lottery contract where both are equally at
fault.556 The common law will therefore neither assist in the

548. See supra note 60 and accompanying discussion.
549. Id.
550. See HERRMANN, supra note 44, at 121 (recognizing the power public
opinion has over the lottery and that “[a]s the public’s view of gambling has
softened, the prevalence and availability of gambling have increased”).
551. NGISC: Final Report, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
552. Id.
553. See id. at 3-17 (explaining that two exceptions are tribal gambling and
internet gambling).
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. See Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 270 (refusing to enforce a contract whose
object violates state anti-gambling statutes); Troy Amusement Co., 28 N.E.2d
at 216 (determining that a scheme involving a movie theater “bank night”
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enforcement of such agreements while they are executory,557 nor
will the courts intervene to grant any equitable remedies558 where
such contracts have been fully performed.559 Inevitably therefore,
plaintiff prizewinners of lottery money prizes cannot blithely
anticipate routine enforcement of agreements by parties who may
have agreed to pay such monies over to plaintiffs.560 Plaintiffs who
sue for enforcement of such agreements will have their suits
routinely dismissed by the courts.561 In the same vein, a principal
cannot successfully recover from his agent sums of money paid to
the agent for sales of lottery tickets.562
In light of the societal value to be derived from the
ameliorative power of public policy in the hands of the judiciary, a
confident assertion may be inescapably valid. Public policy is
exigent to the judicial function in common-law jurisdictions.
Moreover, the judiciary’s prowess in exercising this delicate but
overwhelmingly potent legal power has been magnificently adroit
and unimpeachable. It continues to be so in the present and the
future augurs well in this regard too. The judiciary should
therefore stay firmly astride the unruly horse of public policy.563

violated the state statute against lotteries).
557. Meyer, 626 N.W.2d at 270 (granting defendants summary judgment
and dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for enforcement of an alleged contract to share
lottery proceeds).
558. E.g., any injunctions or rescissions.
559. Troy Amusement Co., 28 N.E.2d at 270 (refusing to grant injunction
where petitioner sought to restrain parties from interfering with petitioner’s
“bank night” lottery operation).
560. See Barquin v. Flores, 459 So. 2d 436, 437 (1984) (dismissing a
complaint seeking to enforce a gambling contract “even though the gambling
proceeds [the plaintiff] sought to recover derived from a Puerto Rican lottery
ticket lawfully purchased by a Puerto Rican resident in Puerto Rico”).
561. Id.
562. See Mexican Int’l Banking Co. v. Lichtenstein, 37 P. 574, 576 (Utah
1894) (“[This court will not] sit to take an account between two thieves from
San Francisco . . . [and] that is what we are asked to do here.”).
563. See Brachtenbach, supra note 2, at 19.

